Can Beliefs Be Based on Practical Reasons?

Abstract

The claim that there are no practical reasons for belief is one commonly made by theorists of reasons and belief. In thinking about different kinds of reasons, some will say there are those that pertain to belief (called epistemic or theoretical) and those pertaining to action (called practical), and that these are completely exclusive domains. 1 To get a grasp of the difference between an epistemic reason and a non-epistemic reason for belief, consider two different kinds of reasons I can have for the belief that my child will awaken from the general anesthetic he was given. The first appeals to the statistics and probabilities that support the truth of the proposition related to the belief in a straightforward way. The second appeals to the value of having the belief; having this belief provides me with peace of mind, allows me to care for my other children and for my child to have his required surgery.1 See Derek Parfit's (2001) very influential discussion on this point. He says "Practical and epistemic reasons are always quite different" though they can be related in important ways. Nomy Arpaly has recently argued that we have no practical reasons to believe: "It is a category mistake to talk about practical reasons to believe." (6) 2 In some discussions of the basing relation, reasons for which we X are also referred to as motivating reasons. For example, Keshav Singh (2018) begins his recent paper by saying "Motivating reasons are the reasons for which we φ . These reasons are also sometimes said to be the reasons in light of which, or the reasons on the basis of which, we act, believe and so on." Other theorists have some qualms talking about motivating reasons for belief because it makes belief seem to be too action-like. Can I have a motivating reason to be in a state? I will mostly avoid talking in terms of motivating reasons, but when I do, I will, like Singh, take them to be equivalent to the reasons for which one believes.