Can behavioral decision theory explain risk-averse fire management decisions?

Abstract

Organizations managing forest land often make fire management decisions that seem overly risk-averse in relation to their stated goals for ecosystem restoration, protection of sensitive species and habitats, and protection of water and timber resources. Research in behavioral decision theory has shown that people faced with difficult decisions under uncertainty and decisions with multiple and conflicting objectives adopt mental shortcuts that systematically bias decision-making. Fire management decisions exhibit exactly the characteristics that are likely to trigger such mental shortcuts. Cumulative and unwitting use of mental shortcuts can lead to fire management decisions that are excessively risk-averse, to the point of jeopardizing stated management goals. It can also cause retrospective analyses of fire decisions to focus inappropriately on placing blame for bad outcomes and fail to scrutinize the quality of the decision itself. Excessive risk aversion is evident in the behavior of individual land managers, land management organizations, regulatory agencies that review land management decisions, and the general public and its agents in the media, courts and legislature. Remedies to excessive risk aversion include: (1) wider use of structured decision processes designed to counteract the mental shortcuts that plague human decision-making, (2) structural and educational changes within and between organizations to change perverse incentives that reward risk aversion and discourage adaptive management, and (3) locally focused collaborations among land management agencies, regulatory agencies, and citizens to build trust and to enhance understanding of forest management goals and practices. #

Deciding Where to Burn: Stakeholder Priorities for Prescribed Burning of a Fire-Dependent Ecosystem

“…burned sites are consistent with previous research that suggests that practitioners exhibit "certainty bias" when making decisions about whether to implement prescribed burning (Maguire and Albright 2005). Under certainty bias, managers tend to view decisions about prescribed burning as a choice between a risky alternative (implement burning) and an alternative with a fairly certain short-term outcome (do not burn).…”

“…Conversely, agency practitioners and nonpractitioners assigned a higher priority to sites inside the WUI. These results suggest that practitioners from private companies have a greater tendency to weight the immediate outcomes from burning in the WUI higher than the long-term potential for wildfire after fuel accumulation due to not burning, which corresponds to a phenomenon in the risk analysis literature called "mental discounting" (Maguire and Albright 2005). Practitioners from private forestry companies generally are under short-term (annual or two-year) Ecology and Society 16(1): 14 http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol16/iss1/art14/ contracts from private individuals and do not own the land they burn.…”

Science synthesis to support socioecological resilience in the Sierra Nevada and southern Cascade Range

“…In addition, short-term losses gather more attention than longer term ones, in part because of the belief that some change intervention will be possible in the future to mitigate longer term losses ). This has been referred to as risk-averse decisionmaking (Maguire and Albright 2005). The focus on addressing and preventing short-term losses and risks further impedes the ability to address longer-term sustainability and resilience.…”

Effects of Elephants on Ecosystems and Biodiversity

“…In the adaptive approach, making mistakes as a result of actions taken is seen as an important source of learning. Mistakes should thus be embraced rather than avoided or feared, as the no-action option can lead to even greater problems (Maguire & Albright, 2005). …”