Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?

Meacham, Christopher J. G.

doi:10.1093/oso/9780198779681.003.0008

Cited by 2 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 25 publications

(40 reference statements)

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“…The threshold is set by the appropriate ratio between R and W . 6 So much for the overview of the framework. The present case for non-contradictory beliefs has the form: and b F < s F .…”

Section: Eut-a Sketchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Steinberger

2019

Analysis

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Epistemic utility theory (EUT) is generally coupled with veritism. Veritism is the view that truth is the sole fundamental epistemic value. Veritism, when paired with EUT, entails a methodological commitment: norms of epistemic rationality are justified only if they can be derived from considerations of accuracy alone. According to EUT, then, believing truly has epistemic value, while believing falsely has epistemic disvalue. This raises the question as to how the rational believer should balance the prospect of true belief against the risk of error. A strong intuitive case can be made for a kind of epistemic conservatism – that we should disvalue error more than we value true belief. I argue that none of the ways in which advocates of veritist EUT have sought to motivate conservatism can be squared with their methodological commitments. Short of any such justification, they must therefore either abandon their most central methodological principle or else adopt a permissive line with respect to epistemic risk.

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“…The threshold is set by the appropriate ratio between R and W . 6 So much for the overview of the framework. The present case for non-contradictory beliefs has the form: and b F < s F .…”

Section: Eut-a Sketchmentioning

confidence: 99%

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Steinberger

2019

Analysis

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Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic

Dethier

2021

Philos Stud

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The best and most popular argument for probabilism is the accuracy-dominance argument, which purports to show that alethic considerations alone support the view that an agent’s degrees of belief should always obey the axioms of probability. I argue that extant versions of the accuracy-dominance argument face a problem. In order for the mathematics of the argument to function as advertised, we must assume that every omniscient credence function is classically consistent; there can be no worlds in the set of dominance-relevant worlds that obey some other logic. This restriction cannot be motivated on alethic grounds unless we’re also willing to accept that rationality requires belief in every metaphysical necessity, as the distinction between a priori logical necessities and a posteriori metaphysical ones is not an alethic distinction. To justify the restriction to classically consistent worlds, non-alethic motivation is required. And thus, if there is a version of the accuracy-dominance argument in support of probabilism, it isn’t one that is grounded in alethic considerations alone.

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Can All-Accuracy Accounts Justify Evidential Norms?

Cited by 2 publications

References 25 publications

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Accuracy and epistemic conservatism

Accuracy, probabilism, and the insufficiency of the alethic

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