Can a stock exchange improve corporate behavior? Evidence from firms' migration to premium listings in Brazil

Corporate Governance, Valuation, and Performance: Evidence from a Voluntary Market Reform in Brazil

“…This relation is economically and statistically significant and robust to the use of simultaneous equations. De Carvalho and Pennacchi (2009) examine the market reaction to voluntary migrations to Bovespa's “good governance” market segments and find a significant decrease in the price differential between voting and nonvoting stocks. This voting premium represents the price shareholders are willing to pay for voting rights and may be used to estimate the lower bound for private benefits of control.…”

Private contracting and corporate governance: Evidence from the provision of tag-along rights in Brazil

“…The control premium, therefore, increases when investor protection is enhanced. De Carvalho and Pennacchi (2010) analyze the migration of Brazilian firms to the tiered listing segments created by BOVESPA in 2000, and find that migration provides shareholders with positive abnormal results and increases the trading volume of nonvoting shares. Furthermore, migration is more likely among large, profitable firms that have experienced positive growth.…”

Methods for Multicountry Studies of Corporate Governance (and Evidence from the BRIKT Countries)

“…At the risk of an annoying amount of self-citation: In Brazil, see Gorga (2010, 2012); Black, de Carvalho and Sampaio (2012), de Carvalho and Pennacchi (2012). In India, see Balasubramanian, Black and Khanna (2010) Black and Khanna (2007); Dharmapala and Khanna (2013).…”