Can a Language Go Mad?

Gaffney, Jennifer

doi:10.5840/philtoday201551471

Cited by 6 publications

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“…See Berkowitz (2010). 13 For more on this interpretation of Eichmann's thoughtlessness and his inability to speak meaningfully, see Shuster (2018), Cassin (2016), andGaffney (2015). 14 See also Sjöholm (2021) and Koishikawa (2018) who similarly emphasize this dimension of Arendt's thinking.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…1313For more on this interpretation of Eichmann's thoughtlessness and his inability to speak meaningfully, see Shuster (2018), Cassin (2016), and Gaffney (2015). …”

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confidence: 99%

“…2525I have developed the argument regarding the relationship between Eichmann's empty talk and his separation from the world at length elsewhere. See Gaffney (2015). …”

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Thinking, meaning, and truth: Arendt on Heidegger and the possibility of critique

Gaffney

2022

Constellations

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Few topics in Arendt's corpus have garnered more attention than her analysis of the dangers inherent in Adolf Eichmann's inability to think. Eichmann revealed what Arendt describes as the banality of evil, a new kind of evil born not of monstrous or demonic motives but of thoughtlessness (Arendt, 2006, p. 54). 1 Yet, while Eichmann made clear the urgent need we have to think, scholars remain at odds as to whether Arendt succeeds in demonstrating that thinking itself has a role to play in preventing evildoing (Bernstein, 2000;Biser, 2014;Formosa, 2016). My aim is to give new orientation to these debates by reconsidering Arendt's critical reception of Martin Heidegger in The Life of the Mind in relation to her claim that thinking must be understood terms of the quest for meaning rather than truth (Arendt, 1978, Vol. 1, p. 15). 2 By developing Arendt's emphasis on meaning this way, I argue that she introduces to thinking a distinctive capacity for critique, one that she takes to be absent in Heidegger and that helps to distinguish her conception of thinking in its ability to intervene in the dangers of thoughtlessness.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1313For more on this interpretation of Eichmann's thoughtlessness and his inability to speak meaningfully, see Shuster (2018), Cassin (2016), and Gaffney (2015). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%