Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

Liu, Ning; Lo, Carlos Wing‐Hung; Zhan, Xueyong; Wang, Wei

doi:10.1111/puar.12285

Cited by 144 publications

(111 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…On the other, the industrial enterprises in the national key eco-industrial areas are usually large state-owned enterprises; they are under direct control of the central government, and they have higher bureaucratic status than local authorities. As a result, these enterprises refused the local EPBs to monitor their environmental behavior [21]. Until 2016, 11 serious water pollution crises occurred in the eco-industrial parks.…”

Section: Phase 3: Environmental Targets Banded With Economic Performamentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Municipal governments, in pursuit of economic performance, may tolerate, or even encourage, entrepreneurial behavior that generated pollution. The local EPBs, which politically and administratively ranked lower than municipal governments, were left with little oversight power over polluting enterprises [21]. The SGEPA in Beijing, moreover, had inadequate human and technical capacities in supervising millions of industrial enterprises spread out all over the country.…”

Section: Phase 3: Environmental Targets Banded With Economic Performamentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bounded Rationality in the Developmental Trajectory of Environmental Target Policy in China, 1972–2016

2018

Sustainability

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This article applies the theoretical notion of "bounded rationality" to understand and to explain the updates of the Environmental Target Policy (ETP) in China during 1972-2016. An analytical framework is built up by combining the phase model and the stream model in policy science in order to trace the longitudinal transformation of the ETP. In addition, the article adopts the "event sequence method" to discover the dynamics of the problem, politics, and policy streams of the target policy and to identify the evolving coupling between the different streams. It shows that China's ETP has experienced five phases of development. For each phase the central government had its specific bounded rationality to make the crucial decision on the ETP. The decisions on the ETP in different phases were made when policy windows were open with the coupling of the problem, politics, and policy streams. As for the updates of the ETP, we find that the rationalities of the central governments in the five phases were limited by the emergent practices during the ETP implementation, which gave momentum to the central government to seek new solutions and to revise and adapt the ETP.

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Section: Phase 3: Environmental Targets Banded With Economic Performamentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Phase 3: Environmental Targets Banded With Economic Performamentioning

confidence: 99%

Bounded Rationality in the Developmental Trajectory of Environmental Target Policy in China, 1972–2016

2018

Sustainability

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“…Our research also sheds light on campaign-style governance. Many countries stage various enforcement campaigns, from road safety campaigns to the war on drugs and anticorruption drives (Liu et al 2015). All levels of the Chinese government tend to rely on campaigns to achieve pressing policy goals or correct deviations in routine bureaucratic procedures (Zhou 2011).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 Environmental awareness is a recent development in China. More than 30 new environmental protection laws, most aimed at energy conservation and emission reduction, have been enacted by the central government since 2005 (Liu et al 2015). The state is beginning to encourage local leaders to reduce urban pollution through the use of ''green GDP'' criteria in the cadre performance evaluation (Landry 2008).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Political Turbulence Changes Disincentives of Environmental Protection: Evidence from the Crime Crackdown in Chongqing

2015

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Institutional disincentives often discourage major actors, such as politicians, corporate leaders, and the public, from taking practical steps to protect the environment in China. By using the crackdown on crime in the Chinese megacity of Chongqing as a case study, we argue that despite the strength of these disincentives, they are nevertheless highly susceptible to changes in the macro political environment, which can temporarily alter the regular preference order of these major political-economic actors and reduce industrial pollution. We employed the difference-in-differences approach and observed that the quality of surface water in Chongqing improved during the anticrime campaign because of reduced industrial wastewater discharge. However, after the campaign, the political atmosphere relaxed and the surface water quality declined. These findings suggest that reforming the institutions that shape the incentives of the major actors in environmental protection is critical to improving environmental protection in the long term.

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“…In addition, some large industrial projects with high economic payoffs and environmental risks were constructed and operated in urban areas without environmental impact assessment. Decisions of municipal governments were made toward tolerating or even protecting the polluting enterprises [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What Conditions, in Combination, Drive Inter-Organizational Activities? Evidence from Cooperation on Environmental Governance in Nine Urban Agglomerations in China

Mu¹,

Jia²,

Leng³

et al. 2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:This study investigates what conditions, in combination, drive varying levels of intensity of inter-organizational activities regarding cooperation on environmental governance in nine urban agglomerations in China. This article distinguishes strong and weak inter-organizational activities; and through a literature review, the article distills five conditions influencing inter-organizational activity, including vertical meta-governance, horizontal meta-governance, leadership, autonomous capacity disparity and environmental status disparity. While these conditions are clearly unique, it is unclear if any of these conditions are necessary or sufficient and how they work collectively, for varying degrees of inter-organization activities. Through the method of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), the article examines this question. The findings suggest that strong horizontal meta-governance and strong leadership are both necessary conditions for strong inter-organizational involvement in joint environmental governance. Small disparities in autonomous capacity and environmental status are sufficient conditions for strong inter-organizational activities. Strong vertical meta-governance is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition. The QCA results reveal that local authorities should put energy in developing their formal structures favorable for cooperation and that local leaders should develop skills to facilitate joint actions between member cities in an agglomeration.

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Campaign‐Style Enforcement and Regulatory Compliance

Cited by 144 publications

References 47 publications

Bounded Rationality in the Developmental Trajectory of Environmental Target Policy in China, 1972–2016

Bounded Rationality in the Developmental Trajectory of Environmental Target Policy in China, 1972–2016

How Political Turbulence Changes Disincentives of Environmental Protection: Evidence from the Crime Crackdown in Chongqing

What Conditions, in Combination, Drive Inter-Organizational Activities? Evidence from Cooperation on Environmental Governance in Nine Urban Agglomerations in China

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