Campaign resources and pre-electoral coalitions

Silva, Patrick Cunha

doi:10.1177/1354068820961623

Cited by 4 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 43 publications

(60 reference statements)

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“…Why is that so? Our explanation holds that due to their access to public office resources and their organizational strength, these parties are more attractive to merge with, which subsequently strengthens their bargaining position and their propensity to merge (also see Silva 2022).…”

Section: Distinguishing Between Different Types Of Repeated Entrymentioning

confidence: 93%

“…Lastly, parties’ expectations about future electoral success may depend on their access to resources. Financial resources, well‐developed organizations characterized by numerous activists and elites, media access, and patronage may all contribute to a party's electoral success (Cyr 2017; Silva 2022; Tavits 2013). As such, we expect that second‐league parties that have better access to key resources are more likely to contest elections again.…”

Section: Explaining Second‐league Parties’ Repeated Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

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One More Time? Parties’ Repeated Electoral Entry in Younger Democracies

Ibenskas

Wardt

2023

American J Political Sci

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Why and how parties continue contesting elections (“repeated entry”) is an underresearched question despite its essence for party survival and party‐system stability. We study repeated entry in three decades of elections in 10 Central and Eastern European countries using a new dataset that records almost 1,000 entry decisions. Our findings underline the importance of separating between first‐ and second‐league parties based on whether in the previous election a party could obtain representation alone. First‐league parties (those that could gain representation alone) almost always contest the next election. Second‐league parties (those that could not win representation alone) exit electoral competition quite frequently and adopt more diverse repeated‐entry strategies. We find that second‐league parties’ repeated entry depends on their closeness to the representation threshold, access to resources, and the number of competitors in their niche, but not on institutional constraints or voter dissatisfaction.

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Section: Distinguishing Between Different Types Of Repeated Entrymentioning

confidence: 93%

Section: Explaining Second‐league Parties’ Repeated Entrymentioning

confidence: 99%

One More Time? Parties’ Repeated Electoral Entry in Younger Democracies

Ibenskas

Wardt

2023

American J Political Sci

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“…Pragmatism is the strongest driving force, but ideology is also taken into account. Silva (2022) presents an empirical analysis of pre-election coalitions in executive elections. The authors provides evidence that the executive candidate may welcome coalition partners not only because of the votes that they can deliver, but also because of the campaign resources that they can bring to the coalition.…”

Section: The Brazilian Electoral Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system and party alignment

Orellano

Tellini²

2022

ECON

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PurposeThis study investigates the impact of political alignment on intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system (SUS). The authors analyzed both automatic transfers based on pre-established rules and discretionary transfers, using two criteria of political alignment between mayors and the central government.Design/methodology/approachFor the empirical analysis the authors used regression-discontinuity design (RDD) and the outcomes of close elections between 2001 and 2017.FindingsThe results indicate positive and statistically significant effects of party alignment on the two transfer categories, especially discretionary transfers, but also on transfers based on pre-established rules. The effect of direct party alignment, when mayors and the president are from the same party, is greater than that resulting from coalitions established in municipal and federal elections.Research limitations/implicationsThe positive effect of party alignment was found both in discretionary transfers (those that do not have previously established rules) and some non-discretionary transfers (although they have previously defined regulations). A part of these regulations depends on production capacity and on taking part in programs promoted by the central government, which may produce entropy in the financing system, and a margin to benefit political allies. In the case of the SUS system, it is possible that this entropy is greater in the basic health care category than in the moderate and high complexity one, allowing a higher margin for discretion in transfers allocated to the former. Stricter rules associated to basic health care transfers would be desirable.Practical implicationsIn Brazil, stricter rules and monitoring associated to basic healthcare intergovernmental transfers would be desirable.Social implicationsThe results may inspire some improvement in the mechanisms that govern the distribution of resources to basic healthcare in Brazil, improving social welfare by improving social justice in the distribution of resources to basic healthcare.Originality/valueThe authors does not know any other study about the impact of party alignment on the distribution of intergovernmental transfers to the Brazilian unified health system.

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