Campaign Finance and Policymaking: PACs, Campaign Contributions, and Interest Group Influence in Congress

Abstract

The general public is skeptical of our current system of campaign finance and feels that members of Congress are corrupt. Although the scholarly literature on campaign contribution influence is mixed, there is growing consensus that Political Action Committees (PACs) and interest groups do, indeed, have a powerful influence on policymaking in Congress. In this article, the author reviews this literature and discusses how influence occurs. Findings reveal that influence is only very rarely an explicit quid pro quo exchange. Instead, it is typically an ongoing, implicit, reciprocal exchange that impacts multiple stages of the legislative process and yields contributors many dividends, such as softer regulations, lower taxes, and lucrative contracts -none of which are explicitly promised (except in rare cases of full-blown bribery) but are, nonetheless, regularly granted. The social relationships between contributors and lawmakers are central to this process, as is the ability to get legislators to sway their colleagues.

It’s Only Wrong If It’s Transactional: Moral Perceptions of Obfuscated Exchange

“…In Study 1, participants were randomly assigned to read one version of a story about an interaction between a defense contractor and a congressman (Part A of the online supplement). We changed the protagonists’ names, but our vignette is loosely based on the prosecution of Representative William Jefferson, a congressman best known for being caught by the FBI in 2005 with $90,000 in cash hidden in his freezer (McCann and Redlawsk 2006; Peoples 2013). In all six versions of our vignette, the defense contractor asks for the congressman’s help in endorsing his company’s equipment for testing by the Army, and the congressman ultimately grants this request.…”

Compared to What? Changes in Interest Group Resources and the Proposal and Adoption of State Teacher Policy

“…Consequently, it is not sufficient to just focus on interest group resource levels or activity when trying to explain policy change. The inconsistent findings found in the current extant literature on interest group resources and policy change (e.g., Ansolabehere et al, 2003; Brownars & Lott, 1997; Chamon & Kaplan, 2013; Hall & Deardorff, 2006; Hall & Wayman, 1990; Peoples, 2013; Powell, 2013; Stratmann, 2005) may be symptomatic of efforts to try and capture single interest group power without considering how the exercise of power might be conditioned by opposing groups and how it might be changing over time.…”

Beyond donors: Toward a sociology of campaign expenditures

“…Following donation patterns is a long‐established practice for tracing political activity and cohesion among political and corporate elite (Burris, 2005; Heerwig, 2018; Heerwig & Murray, 2019; Mizruchi, 1989). Campaign finance reform influences who donates money, how much they donate, and how money is raised and spent within civil society (Hertel‐Fernandez et al., 2018; Miller, 1986; Peoples, 2013). PACs have garnered attention from sociologists for their ability to donate to and spend money advocating for particular candidates and said spending’s potential for corporate influence on politicians (Clawson et al., 1992; Peoples, 2013).…”

“…Campaign finance reform influences who donates money, how much they donate, and how money is raised and spent within civil society (Hertel‐Fernandez et al., 2018; Miller, 1986; Peoples, 2013). PACs have garnered attention from sociologists for their ability to donate to and spend money advocating for particular candidates and said spending’s potential for corporate influence on politicians (Clawson et al., 1992; Peoples, 2013). This allows outside donors to have greater control over the production and distribution of ideas beyond political society.…”