Cameroon's Neopatrimonial dilemma

Negotiating an Anglophone Identity: A Study of the Politics of Recognition and Representation in Cameroon

“…Besides being political avenues to economic modernisation and growth, they allowed the government to engage in prebendal politics and to cement a hegemonic alliance, incorporating the country's emerging elite into the state apparatus (Bayart 1979). A patrimonial logic existed in many post-colonial African states (Chabal & Daloz 1999) but it was particularly strong in Cameroon, a country with stark ethnic and regional cleavages (Nyamnjoh 1999;Gabriel 1999). It is beyond any doubt that this logic contributed to the poor performance of most public and para-public enterprises (Tedga 1990;Van de Walle 1994).…”

“…The new regime's barons appeared to be much bolder in staking claim to the state's resources than Ahidjo's supporters had been. Corruption and rent-seeking were always fundamental characteristics of the regime (Joseph 1978;Médard 1977;Gabriel 1999) but after 1984, they increased to a point at which the system became dysfunctional. When this political conjuncture was combined with a severe exogenous economic shock, the system finally started to crumble.…”

“…In reply to the Anglophone demand for a return to the federal state, Biya has claimed, like Ahidjo, that this tends to be costly, weak as far as state power is concerned, and divisive, provoking ethnic and regional sentiments rather than a national consciousness. He has apparently overlooked the fact that the unitary state's patrimonial tendencies and its politicisation of ethnicity may be even more costly and divisive (Chabal & Daloz 1999;Gabriel 1999). While repeatedly declining to discuss the federal or so-called 'two-state option', he eventually expressed his willingness to concede a certain degree of decentralisation within the unitary state based on the present ten provinces in Cameroon, the so-called 'ten-state/region option'.…”

Revisiting the politics of belonging in Cameroon

“…In the Cameroonian case the national government has been shown to have instrumentalized the sentiments associated with home in its own interest (Eyoh 1998;Fonchingong 2005;Gabriel 1999; P. Nkwi and Socpa 1997;W. Nkwi 2006;Nyamnjoh 1999;Yenshu 2006).…”

Good governance, privatisation and ethno-regional conflict in Cameroon

“…According to Nicolas van de Walle (1994: 155-56), public enterprises in Cameroon 'proved to be an ideal instrument to distribute state resources in the form of jobs, rents, power and prestige', enabling the president to reward allies and co-opt opponents, and thus 'secure his own power base'. A 'patrimonial logic' existed in many African post-colonial states (Chabal & Daloz 1999), but was particularly forceful in Cameroon, a country with stark ethno-regional cleavages (Ngayap 1983;Kofele-Kale 1986;Gabriel 1999). State resources could be used to forge the ethno-regional alliances necessary for national unity and political stability and to obviate the need for coercion.…”