Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation

Dewenter, Ralf; Kruse, Jörn

doi:10.1016/j.infoecopol.2010.09.001

Cited by 25 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…We therefore estimate Tobit models to account for this censoring. 10 Since the subsidies are matching grants where the percentage of covered costs can vary, we split R&D investment into the part that is induced by the policy and the amount that a firm invested anyways from private resources as indicated in Equation 1. In other words, we separate R&D expenditures into two components: R&D expenditures which would have taken place even if the subsidy scheme was not in place ( & ) and…”

Section: Innovation Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

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(International) R&D collaboration and SMEs: The effectiveness of targeted public R&D support schemes

2014

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Non-technical summaryIt is today widely acknowledged that innovation constitutes one of the most important drivers of economic growth and competitiveness (see e.g. Solow, 1957;Griliches, 1979Griliches, , 1992Hall, 1996). Private sector firms' investment in R&D plays a crucial role in this process not only for the discovery of new technologies, but also for their diffusion.Because of various well-known market failures though, it is unlikely that left alone, firms would invest the socially optimal amount in R&D. For this reason, governments design various policy schemes to stimulate investment in R&D. In Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, the government has spent 628 million euros on direct support for R&D and innovation for a total of 3,019 projects between 2002 and 2008. Thereby Flanders employs regional-specific policy design -i.e. a dual policy focusing on small and medium-sized firms (SMEs) on the one hand and (international) collaboration, on the other.The present research aims, on the one hand at evaluating whether these targeted measures are efficient in terms of input additionality, and, on the other hand, whether they translate into innovation output. With respect to input, we find that subsidies accelerate R&D spending in the private sector. When analyzing the impact of the specific policy features on the treatment effect, we find evidence for the efficacy of the policy currently in use. In particular, we find that SMEs have a larger treatment effect than larger-sized firms. We further find that internationally collaborating SMEs have a larger treatment effect than internationally collaborating larger firms or non-internationally collaborating SMEs.Further, we implement the results of the treatment effects analysis into a series of innovation output models, where R&D is disentangled into purely privately financed R&D (i.e. R&D expenditures that the firm would have spent in any case) and subsidy induced R&D expenditure. We find that both types have a significant positive effect on firms'innovativeness measured by their share of sales from market novelties. Further, when interacting both types of R&D investment with the specific policy features of the funding scheme under review, we find that the policy-triggered effect on market novelties is highest for internationally collaborating firms. Das Wichtigste in KürzeForschung und Entwicklung (F&E) und die daraus resultierenden Innovationen leisten einen wesentlichen Beitrag zu Wirtschaftswachstum und We...

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Section: Innovation Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where NOVEL * is the unobserved latent variable. The observed dependent variable is equal to NOVEL = * ɛ 0 0 (7) 10…”

Section: Innovation Performance Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

(International) R&D collaboration and SMEs: The effectiveness of targeted public R&D support schemes

2014

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“…Should we find this evidence, then one way of reading our results is that 4 Cunnigham et al (2010) also find evidence of the waterbed effect in a cross-section of countries. This is also the conclusion of Dewenter and Kruse (2011), although they follow an indirect approach, as they test the impact of termination regulation on diffusion of mobile telephony, rather than looking directly at the impact on mobile prices. Since the waterbed effect predicts that high termination rates should be associated with low mobile prices, it also predicts that diffusion will be faster in those markets with high termination rates, which is what Dewenter and Kruse (2011) find.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Seesaw in the Air: Interconnection Regulation and the Structure of Mobile Tariffs

Genakos

Valletti

2010

SSRN Journal

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Interconnection rates are a key variable in telecommunications markets. Every call that is placed must be terminated by the network of the receiving party, thus the termination end has the characteristic of an economic bottleneck and is subject to regulation in many countries. This paper examines the impact of regulatory intervention to cut termination rates of calls to mobile phones. We argue that regulatory cuts should have a differential impact according to the type of tariff the mobile customer subscribes to. While all mobile customers may pay higher prices because of a "waterbed" effect, termination rates also affect competition among mobile operators. We show that the waterbed effect is diluted, but not eliminated, for customers with pre-paid cards, where regulation also acts as impediment to "raise-each-other's-cost" collusive strategies that mobile networks can adopt. The waterbed effect is instead strongest for consumers with monthly (post-paid) subscription contracts.

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“…, where p 2 1 is given by (10). Potential offenders choose to offend when criminal gains are greater than or equal tob 1 (b 2 ), believing that…”

Section: The Possibility Of Information Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 in this case is equal to .78, balancing the fact that the policy maker tends toward an overstatement in the first segment of the partition and toward an understatement in the second. 10 The scenario in which parameters are such that ∆ is positive or negative depending on the level of p is not a case that allows for a finer partition.…”

Section: The Critical Level Pmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cheap Talk About the Detection Probability

Baumann

Friehe²

2012

SSRN Journal

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. The working papers published in the Series constitute work in progress circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comments. Views expressed represent exclusively the authors' own opinions and do not necessarily reflect those of the editor. Terms of use: Documents in Cheap Talk About the Detection ProbabilityFlorian Baumann * Tim Friehe † April 2013Abstract This paper analyzes whether the behavior of potential offenders can be guided by information on the actual detection probability transmitted by the policy maker. It is established that, when viewed as a cheap-talk game, the existence of equilibria with information transmission depends on the level of the sanction, the level of costs related to imposing the sanction, and the level of social harm resulting from the offense. In addition, we find that the policy maker (i.e., society as a whole) is not necessarily better off ex ante when more information is transmitted in equilibrium, but that potential offenders always are.

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Calling party pays or receiving party pays? The diffusion of mobile telephony with endogenous regulation

Cited by 25 publications

References 31 publications

(International) R&D collaboration and SMEs: The effectiveness of targeted public R&D support schemes

(International) R&D collaboration and SMEs: The effectiveness of targeted public R&D support schemes

Seesaw in the Air: Interconnection Regulation and the Structure of Mobile Tariffs

Cheap Talk About the Detection Probability

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