Cake or death? Ending confusions about asymmetries between consent and refusal

Risk-related standards of competence are a nonsense

“…I suggest that an acrobat of middling reliability might be foolhardy to walk the line without a safety net strung below, while there might be nothing untoward in their attempting it with net in place; and I see it as entirely in accordance with correct usage to describe this as a case where the acrobat is competent to walk the line in the second instance but not in the first 12. (p750) citing5 (p156)…”

“…In an excellent and rigorous article published in the JME in 2016, Rob Lawlor revisits the issue of asymmetry 10 12. Taken as a whole, his article argues that asymmetry is an ambiguous term.…”

“…Wilks is talking about an acrobat with only a moderate degree of tightrope-walking competence. For this individual, because of the different risks, and given his/her level of tightrope-walking competence, we are likely to judge him/her to be foolhardy if he/she walks the rope with no safety net, but we would not think it foolhardy if he/she chose to walk the rope with a safety net 12…”

“…In decision-making, just as in acrobatics, there can be two variables involved: (1) how difficult the decision is and (2) how risky or significant the decision is. If this is true, Wilks’ argument applies to decision-making as much as it applies to acrobatics 12. (p750)…”

“…However, because the significance of one choice (death) is much greater than the significance of the other choice, there is nothing incoherent about having different standards in each case, such that we require a higher level of competence in order to consider someone competent enough to choose death and a lower level of competence to choose cake. If I offer a person the choice of cake or death, the person can meet the standard that is appropriate to be considered competent enough to choose cake, even if they do not meet the standard appropriate to be competent enough to choose death 12. (p751)…”