Abstract:How it came about that a kindly friend, the rector of our parish, thought it worth while to bid a school-boy in his 'teens to tackle Berkeley's Principles and earlier Dialogues was on this wise. I may have mentioned an incident at my grandfather's table, years before, when he gravely asserted that if the housekeeper, the cook, the errand boy, the shopman, and their maker, had not thought of sausages there would be no sausages for breakfast; and that if none of us saw them, smelled them, or tasted them, we shou… Show more
“…Morgan's early philosophical writings reveal a clear development in their author's thinking about the possibility of animal cognition research. As a young avid reader of George Berkeley (Morgan 1930a) struck by the power of the epistemological problem of other minds (Morgan 1880), Morgan wrote that The results of comparative psychology—the science which has for its object the comparative study of those distorted images of our own mental processes—are incapable of verification … “Is there a science of comparative psychology?” [I submit] an emphatic negative. (Morgan 1884: 371).…”
In this article, I explore how researchers’ metaphysical commitments can be conducive—or unconducive—to progress in animal cognition research. The methodological dictum known as Morgan's Canon exhorts comparative psychologists to countenance the least mentalistic fair interpretation of animal actions. This exhortation has frequently been misread as a blanket condemnation of mentalistic interpretations of animal behaviors that could be interpreted behavioristically. But Morgan meant to demand only that researchers refrain from accepting default interpretations of (apparent) actions until other fair interpretations have been duly considered. The Canon backfired largely because of Morgan's background metaphysical commitment to a univocal, hierarchical, and anthropocentric account of cognitive architecture. I make the case that, going forward, comparative psychologists would do well to pair judicious use of Morgan's Canon with an openness to the existence of non‐humanlike animal minds comprising phenomena belonging to distinct cognitive and folk psychological ontologies. And I argue that this case gives us pragmatic reason to reconcile deep—e.g., psychofunctionalist—and superficial—e.g., dispositionalist—approaches to the metaphysics of belief.
“…Morgan's early philosophical writings reveal a clear development in their author's thinking about the possibility of animal cognition research. As a young avid reader of George Berkeley (Morgan 1930a) struck by the power of the epistemological problem of other minds (Morgan 1880), Morgan wrote that The results of comparative psychology—the science which has for its object the comparative study of those distorted images of our own mental processes—are incapable of verification … “Is there a science of comparative psychology?” [I submit] an emphatic negative. (Morgan 1884: 371).…”
In this article, I explore how researchers’ metaphysical commitments can be conducive—or unconducive—to progress in animal cognition research. The methodological dictum known as Morgan's Canon exhorts comparative psychologists to countenance the least mentalistic fair interpretation of animal actions. This exhortation has frequently been misread as a blanket condemnation of mentalistic interpretations of animal behaviors that could be interpreted behavioristically. But Morgan meant to demand only that researchers refrain from accepting default interpretations of (apparent) actions until other fair interpretations have been duly considered. The Canon backfired largely because of Morgan's background metaphysical commitment to a univocal, hierarchical, and anthropocentric account of cognitive architecture. I make the case that, going forward, comparative psychologists would do well to pair judicious use of Morgan's Canon with an openness to the existence of non‐humanlike animal minds comprising phenomena belonging to distinct cognitive and folk psychological ontologies. And I argue that this case gives us pragmatic reason to reconcile deep—e.g., psychofunctionalist—and superficial—e.g., dispositionalist—approaches to the metaphysics of belief.
“…While this approach is fruitful and interesting, it does not demonstrate learning in an individual plant. When attempting to interpret plant learning in terms of cognitive constructs, it is important to recall that simple psychological answers should be assumed over complicated solutions ( Morgan, 1898/1977 ).…”
This article provides an overview of the early Mimosa pudica literature; much of which is in journals not easily accessible to the reader. In contrast to the contemporary plant learning literature which is conducted primarily by plant biologists, this early literature was conducted by comparative psychologists whose goal was to search for the generality of learning phenomena such as habituation, and classical conditioning using experimental designs based on animal conditioning studies. In addition to reviewing the early literature, we hope to encourage collaborations between plant biologists and comparative psychologists by familiarizing the reader with issues in the study of learning faced by those working with animals. These issues include no consistent definition of learning phenomena and an overreliance on the use of cognition. We suggested that greater collaborative efforts be made between plant biologists and comparative psychologists if the study of plant learning is to be fully intergraded into the mainstream behavior theory.
“…To borrow from Ross’s (1989, pp. 341 & 347, respectively; quoting Morgan, 1930 /1961, & Valliant, 1977) treatment of this difficult issue of adults attempting to remember earlier experiences, consider the following: Herein lies a difficulty in any autobiographical sketch which purports to deal with one’s mental development. It is a story of oneself in the past, read in the light of one’s present self.…”
Section: A Developmental Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a story of oneself in the past, read in the light of one’s present self. There is much supplementary inference—often erroneous inference—wherein “must have been” masquerades as “was so.” (Morgan, 1930 /1961, p. 237) “ It is all too common for caterpillars to become butterflies and then to maintain that in their youth they had been little butterflies. Maturation makes liars of us all.” (Valiant, 1977, p. 197)…”
Section: A Developmental Perspectivementioning
confidence: 99%
“…It is a story of oneself in the past, read in the light of one’s present self. There is much supplementary inference—often erroneous inference—wherein “must have been” masquerades as “was so.” (Morgan, 1930 /1961, p. 237) “…”
scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.
