Bycatch levies could reconcile trade-offs between blue growth and biodiversity conservation

Abstract

Economic activities in the ocean (i.e. the 'blue economy') provide value to society, yet also jeopardise marine ecosystems. For example, fisheries are an essential source of income and food security for billions of people, yet bycatch poses a major threat to marine biodiversity, creating trade-offs between economic growth and biodiversity conservation. This paper explores bycatch levies as a market-based instrument for reconciling these trade-offs. We outline the theory and practice of bycatch levies, to demonstrate how they could incentivise bycatch prevention and raise revenue for compensatory conservation, provided they are well-designed, as part of a policy mix for sustainable and equitable ocean governance. We then explore ways forward for mainstreaming bycatch levies in to the blue economy. While compensatory bycatch mitigation has been controversial, increasing adoption of net outcome approaches to biodiversity conservation suggests they could become mainstreamed within the next decade. Bycatch levies could raise millions of dollars towards closing global biodiversity financing gaps; delivering net outcomes for biodiversity under the UN Biodiversity post-2020 framework whilst enabling blue growth, and moving towards win-wins for economic welfare and biodiversity conservation.

Estimating economic losses to small‐scale fishers from shark conservation: A hedonic price analysis

“…Our findings also contribute to broader debates regarding reconciling biodiversity conservation with social justice and human rights (Newing & Perram, 2019;Shoreman-Ouimet & Kopnina, 2015); and in particular the need to ensure the costs of conservation are equitably distributed, and that conservation interventions "do no harm" (Balmford & Whitten, 2003;Bennett et al, 2019;Giron-Nava et al, 2021;Griffiths, Bull, Baker, & Milner-Gulland, 2019). In small-scale fisheries, one option for simultaneously delivering conservation and social welfare outcomes could be through compensation or payment for ecosystem service schemes, which incentivize fishers to reduce capture of the most threatened species while maintaining their material well-being (Bladon, Short, Mohammed, & Milner-Gulland, 2016;Booth, Arlidge, & Squires, 2021;Wosnick, Da Costa De Lima Wosiak, & Machado Filho, 2020). Given the high value of the shark and ray tourism industry in Indonesia (Mustika, Ichsan, & Booth, 2020;O'Malley, Lee-Brooks, & Medd, 2013), it could be possible to gather funding through tourism taxes or donations, and channel this into conservation, including fisher compensation for economic losses incurred from not catching sharks (Vianna et al, 2018).…”

“…Given the high value of the shark and ray tourism industry in Indonesia (Mustika, Ichsan, & Booth, 2020;O'Malley, Lee-Brooks, & Medd, 2013), it could be possible to gather funding through tourism taxes or donations, and channel this into conservation, including fisher compensation for economic losses incurred from not catching sharks (Vianna et al, 2018). Similarly, bycatch levies could be introduced for commercial fisheries, with the funds invested in critical habitat conservation and assisting small-scale fishers to adapt (Booth, Arlidge, & Squires, 2021;Gjertsen, Squires, Dutton, & Eguchi, 2014;Pakiding et al, 2020).…”

“…Firstly, understanding wildlife market dynamics can reveal important information on tradedriven extinction risk and drivers of exploitation (Challender et al, 2015;McClenachan et al, 2016;McNamara et al, 2016). Secondly, this information can be used to design cost-effective management interventions, such as: identifying leverage points within supply chains (McNamara et al, 2016;Nuno et al, 2018;t' Sas-Rolfes, Challender, Hinsley, Veríssimo, & Milner-Gulland, 2019); weighing-up costs and benefits of different interventions, and their distributional impacts (Ban & Klein, 2009;Naidoo et al, 2006;Visconti, Bakkenes, Smith, Joppa, & Sykes, 2015); and identifying least-cost or market-based solutions, such as incentives or compensation (Booth, Arlidge, & Squires, 2021;Lubchenco, Cerny-Chipman, Reimer, & Levin, 2016;Travers, Clements, & Milner-Gulland, 2016). Finally, market signals can also serve as indicators of market distortions or responses to regulations, to monitor the impacts of interventions (Booth, Pooley, et al, 2020;Challender et al, 2015).…”

Designing locally-appropriate conservation incentives for small-scale fishers

“…BMIS, 2021), but less is known about how to encourage their adoption. Doing so is challenging, because it requires changing human behaviour amidst trade-offs between biodiversity conservation and the important socio-economic roles of fisheries (Booth, Arlidge, et al, 2021;Campbell & Cornwell, 2008). This is particularly problematic in small-scale mixed-species fisheries, where almost all catches have economic or subsistence value.…”

“…At the systemic level, gaining a better understanding of the cost-effectiveness of market-based mechanisms for marine conservation is increasingly important under growing adoption of net-outcome goals for biodiversity (including under the CBD post-2020 framework) (CBD, 2020;Maron et al, 2021). For example, just as carbon emitters can compensate for emissions via carbon offsetting, and investors and consumers are increasingly demanding 'deforestation-free' terrestrial supply chains, so they could demand 'biodiversity-neutral' fish supply chains and coastal development projects (Booth, Arlidge, et al, 2021). This will require that entities that damage marine biodiversity offset their impacts through measurable.…”