Buteyko

Germany’s Role in the Euro Crisis

“…96 Successful German resistance to the establishment of a reliable firewall may again raise doubts in the markets about the sustainability of sovereign debt and the viability of the monetary union. 97 In sum, the Merkel government's attitude toward the Greek sovereign debt crisis began to change in spring 2010. The Chancellor recognized that, given the reality of extensive trade and financial interconnectedness, a disorderly euro area hurts not just the periphery, but the core.…”

“….have the same effect and if they have been approved by the institution," Chancellor Merkel said. 97 The Commission determined that the reform list, Mr. Varoufakis submitted to Mr. Dijsselbloem, 98 "is sufficiently comprehensive to be a valid starting point for a successful conclusion of the review." It added that "the key for a successful conclusion of the review" is the preparedness of the Greek government to "trans- 96 The Chancellor referred to an inventory of incompelete reforms made by former Greek Finance Minister Gikas Hardouvelis on December 10, 2014 which became the focus of particular disdain for the Syriza party on the campaign trail.…”

“…But if "others were living beyond their means, [while] Germany avoided excesses", one begins to wonder how these "cultural peculiarities" can be adjusted in such a way that the German view of a reformed euro area as a Disziplin union is accepted everywhere as the only way forward. 97 Stark's observation together with Merkel's preference for intergovernmental cooperation along the lines of a refurbished Maastricht Treaty have two simple flaws: there is no consensus among the member countries to act in a way that is consistent with the needs of a monetary union. The call for a "central fiscal stabiliser" with "central intervention and control rights" is as a contentious within the Union as the call for "common fiscal arrangements".…”