But anyone can mix their labor: a reply to Cheneval

Abstract

Francis Cheneval has recently argued that people have property rights over personal data about themselves. Until now, the discussion on data ownership has primarily been a discussion among legal theorists and economists. Cheneval contribution to the discussion is a very welcome input from academic philosophy. Cheneval attempts to reach his conclusion through two distinct strategies. One strategy is to reach the conclusion through a Lockean inspired libertarian rights-based theory of property. The second strategy is to reach his conclusion through a Rawlsian account of distributive justice. According to Cheneval, his conclusion can be reached both ways. In this reply, I will focus exclusively on Cheneval argument that people have Lockean inspired libertarian property rights over personal data. I will offer an objection, which-if correct -demonstrates demonstrates how Cheneval Lockean argument runs into a dilemma.

Inferences and the Right to Privacy

“…For different versions of the control theory, see e.g. Moore 2003;Moore 2010;Inness 1992;Fried 1968;Parent 1983;Marmor 2015;Mainz &Uhrenfeldt 2020 andMenges 2020. So-called access theorists often add the extra necessary condition that someone must actually access the agent's personal matters in order for her right to privacy to be violated.…”