Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*

Chen, Ting; Kung, James Kai-sing

doi:10.1093/qje/qjy027

Cited by 261 publications

(105 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

104

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Non‐homegrown provincial party secretaries, who are less familiar with local conditions, may specialize in developing the provincial capital city, in order to reap the largest benefits in the shortest time. One possibility, as Chen and Kung () points out, is to sell the land of the provincial capital to firms controlled by the princelings. It is therefore instructive to examine the intraprovincial variation in the economic effect of provincial leadership turnover.…”

Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Notes: "0" indicates the year when a new provincial party secretary takes office, whereas "−1" the year before. Each estimate comes from a distinct regression specification with full set of control variables as in the last two specifications of Table 2 [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com] possibility, as Chen and Kung (2018) points out, is to sell the land of the provincial capital to firms controlled by the princelings. It is therefore instructive to examine the intraprovincial variation in the economic effect of provincial leadership turnover.…”

Section: Location Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, an insider provincial leader may appoint mayors of prefecture‐level cities based on factional ties, rather than competence. In fact, Chen and Kung () show that some local cadres who sell local land to firms controlled by the “princelings”—members of China's supreme political elite—at a discount rate experience faster promotion. This type of patronage exchanges is at odds with the meritocratic political selection depicted in earlier studies (Chen & Kung, ).…”

Section: Potential Effects Of Factional Ties On Cadre Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Wong

Zhong

2019

Economics & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Some attribute China's rapid economic growth to a cadre promotion system that rewards economic performance. Others argue that political promotion in China hinges on factionalism. Extant empirical studies often assume that performance can be measured independently from the effect of factionalism. We test the validity of this assumption by examining whether local cadres’ economic performance would change as a result of losing vertical ties to a higher authority. We find an immediate increase in the growth rates of local GDP and government revenue. However, the performance change is mediated by the type of succeeding leaders, as it occurs only under locally promoted leaders who have existing ties with the local cadres. We further examine various channels through which a leader's insider status may affect local economic performance and find that newly appointed outsider leaders would cut fiscal transfers to the local level, which may explain the drop in their short‐term performance.

show abstract

Section: Extensionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Location Heterogeneitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Potential Effects Of Factional Ties On Cadre Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Wong

Zhong

2019

Economics & Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…The party nomenklatura and private business cultivate strong links both at the institutional and personal level. Numbers of party members have changed a career to become successful entrepreneurs (the so-called xiahai entrepreneurs) and many thriving entrepreneurs have been co-opted into the party ranks (Dickson 2003, p. 5;Chen and Dickson 2010). This close interdependence magnifies the importance of political connections in the China's economy today (Fan et al 2007, Calomiris et al 2010, Nee and Opper 2010, Guo et al 2014, Kung and Ma 2016, Chen and Kung 2018.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In fact,Chen and Dickson (2010) argue that their relationship is better described as that of "allies". Also, seeDickson (2003) on the beliefs of entrepreneurs.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

From Workers to Capitalists in Less Than Two Generations: A Study of Chinese Urban Elite Transformation Between 1988 and 2013

Li¹,

Novokmet²,

Milanović³

2020

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Economic and social transformation of China during the past 40 years is without precedent in human history. While the economic transformation was extensively studied, social transformation was not. In this paper, we use for the first time harmonized household surveys covering the period 1988-2013 to study the changes in the characteristics the richest 5 percent of China's urban population. We find that the elite changed from being composed of high government officials, clerical staff, and workers in 1988 to professionals and small and large business owners in 2013. The educational level of the elite increased substantially. Membership in CCP has a positive (albeit small) effect on one's income but is particularly valuable to large business owners.

show abstract

De‐politicization and corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from China

Qiu,

Zhou

2024

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Given the lack of consensus in the existing studies about the impact of political resources on corporate social responsibility (CSR), we delve into this relationship and analyze the underlying mechanisms. To address the endogenous problems associated with political connection, this paper explores the consequence of de‐politicization and adopts an exogenous event in China. Results indicate that de‐politicization significantly enhances the CSR performance of firms. Specifically, de‐politicization can lead to a 1.474 increase in CSR scores. This finding is further supported by various robustness tests. Additionally, this paper probes into the reasons for the positive influence focusing on prerequisite and driving forces. For one thing, de‐politicization reduces the rent‐seeking expenses of politically connected firms, thereby granting these firms enough financial resources to improve their CSR performance. For another thing, CSR practices can convey positive information, improve financial performance, and enhance competitiveness, which motivates firms to actively participate in CSR issues to alleviate the adverse influence of losing political connection. This paper enriches the existing research on political connections and provides theoretical guidance and policy recommendations for improving CSR in developing countries.

show abstract

Busting the “Princelings”: The Campaign Against Corruption in China’s Primary Land Market*

Cited by 261 publications

References 43 publications

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

Familiarity breeds growth: The impact of factional ties on local cadres’ economic performance in China

From Workers to Capitalists in Less Than Two Generations: A Study of Chinese Urban Elite Transformation Between 1988 and 2013

De‐politicization and corporate social responsibility: Empirical evidence from China

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About