Bureaucracies in Historical Political Economy

Vogler, Jan P.

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780197618608.013.19

Cited by 6 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 11 publications

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“…We focus on three promising areas of bureaucratic politics: personnel, oversight, and external influence. There are other important areas of research on bureaucratic politics, including historical development (Vogler 2023), macro-level models of bureaucratic governance (Dahlström & Lapuente 2022), citizen-bureaucrat interactions (Pepinsky et al 2017, Grossman & Slough 2022, and corruption (Gans-Morse et al 2018)-but we believe personnel, oversight, and influence are three areas that hold considerable promise for cross-subfield learning. By juxtaposing and contrasting recent research from American and comparative politics in these three arenas, we seek to foster a more productive research agenda on bureaucracies everywhere.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science

Brierley

Lowande

Potter

et al. 2023

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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Bureaucracy is everywhere. Unelected bureaucrats are a key link between government and citizens, between policy and implementation. Bureaucratic politics constitutes a growing share of research in political science. But the way bureaucracy is studied varies widely, permitting theoretical and empirical blind spots as well as opportunities for innovation. Scholars of American politics tend to focus on bureaucratic policy making at the national level, while comparativists often home in on local implementation by street-level bureaucrats. Data availability and professional incentives have reinforced these subfield-specific blind spots over time. We highlight these divides in three prominent research areas: the selection and retention of bureaucratic personnel, oversight of bureaucratic activities, and opportunities for influence by actors external to the bureaucracy. Our survey reveals how scholars from the American and comparative politics traditions can learn from one another.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science

Brierley

Lowande

Potter

et al. 2023

Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.

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The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies along the Administrative Hierarchy

Vogler

2022

St Comp Int Dev

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Could imperial rule affect state institutions at the national, regional, and local level differently? No systematic theory to answer this question exists, which is surprising given the importance that is attributed to foreign rule for political-administrative organization around the world. The effectiveness of imperial rule may differ along the administrative hierarchy because empires are often subject to financial constraints, limits on organizational capabilities, and informational asymmetries. Therefore, a commonly used approach—aggregation at the national level—may yield erroneous findings about colonial legacies by ignoring vital nuances. To address this gap, I develop a novel theory of imperial pervasiveness and test it through a number of statistical analyses. Leveraging an original dataset of citizen perceptions of state institutions in Romania, this study reveals vastly different long-term effects of historical Habsburg rule at the regional and local levels. The results indicate that we need to rethink the study of colonial origins.

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State-Building in Historical Political Economy

Garfias

Sellars²

2023

The Oxford Handbook of Historical Political Economy

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Under what conditions do strong states under a centralized political authority emerge? This chapter presents a theoretical framework that summarizes and synthesizes insights from recent research in historical political economy on state building. The chapter examines the decision of a central authority who weighs the costs and benefits of state building by taxing the population to defend against a threat. The analysis illustrates prominent arguments in the literature, including the role of external conflict, military technology, nontax revenue, societal wealth, the technology of taxation, and fiscal legibility in state building. The chapter then considers how powerful local elites, whose interests may not align with the central authority, can shift a ruler’s willingness and ability to centralize power, drawing a connection with the literatures on intra-elite conflict and limited government. Finally, the chapter expands the framework to incorporate non-elite citizens, who can pressure elites and central authorities through the threat of rebellion from below, to discuss the role of elite-mass relations in state building.

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Bureaucracies in Historical Political Economy

Cited by 6 publications

References 11 publications

Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science

Bureaucratic Politics: Blind Spots and Opportunities in Political Science

The Complex Imprint of Foreign Rule: Tracking Differential Legacies along the Administrative Hierarchy

State-Building in Historical Political Economy

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