Burdens of Proof and the Case for Unevenness

Abstract

How is the burden of proof to be distributed among individuals who are involved in resolving a particular issue? Under what conditions should the burden of proof be distributed unevenly? We distinguish attitudinal from dialectical burdens and argue that these questions should be answered differently, depending on which is in play. One has an attitudinal burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to possess sufficient evidence for it. One has a dialectical burden with respect to some proposition when one is required to provide supporting arguments for it as part of a deliberative process. We show that the attitudinal burden with respect to certain propositions is unevenly distributed in some deliberative contexts, but in all of these contexts, establishing the degree of support for the proposition is merely a means to some other deliberative end, such as action guidance, or persuasion. By contrast, uneven distributions of the dialectical burden regularly further the aims of deliberation, even in contexts where the quest for truth is the sole deliberative aim, rather than merely a means to some different deliberative end. We argue that our distinction between these two burdens resolves puzzles about unevenness that have been raised in the literature.

Facilitating Deliberative Play

“…Given the paucity of transdisciplinary work on deliberative democracy, it is notable that deliberative play has not been conceptualized prior to Craig (2023). Deliberative play has been used as a turn of phrase (e.g., Aijaz, McKeown-Green, and Webster, 2013; Loveland & Popsecu, 2011; Özden, 2019) but not as a practice. Gordon, Hass, and Michaelson (2017) explore how qualities of play can contribute to effective deliberation in their analysis of role-playing games within participatory budgeting.…”

The Burden of Proof in Philosophical Persuasion Dialogue

“…Rescorla 2009b;Aijaz, McKeown-Green and Webster 2013). I can, as a matter of fact, deny that Knowledge is a socially constructed kind yet wonder whether this proposition might not be true after all.…”

“…That notwithstanding, I subsequently employ 'asserting that P' and cognate expressions solely to denote 'committing dialogically to the truth of P' and cognate expressions, and correspondingly with regard to the foregoing examples of the other dialogical and attitudinal commitments. 7 The terminology for this separation, 'attitudinal' versus 'dialogical', is adapted from Aijaz et al (2013).…”

Argumentation, rationality, and psychology of reasoning

“…Call this the accountability assumption. The accountability assumption begins to reveal the deontological aspects of argumentative rationality, according to which rational agents have obligations pertaining to their cognitive comportment as well as their communicative activities (Aijaz, McKeown-Green and Webster 2013). That is to say, rational agents have rational obligations.…”