Bundling and Joint Marketing by Rival Firms

Abstract

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Product bundling and advertising strategy for a duopoly supply chain: a power-balance perspective

“…Bundling can involve product bundling or price bundling (Beheshtian-Ardakani et al 2018). Product bundling defines integrated products that provides extra value to the customers and price bundling consists of a package sold at a discount rate, without any integration of the goods and/or services involved (Adomavicius et al 2015;Giri et al 2020;Jeitschko et al 2017;Vamosiu 2018). In addition, depending on the number of items bundled, the nature of such items and the degree of variations, bundling can also reduce consumer costs (Yan et al 2014).…”

Bundling and joint marketing by rival firms

“…However, the comparison serves to develop the underlying economics that drive pricing and consumption across the two cases. The detailed derivations for the results in this section are found in the working paper versionJeitschko, Jung, and Kim (2014).17 As one reviewer noted, this is similar to the logic underlying why bargaining after price setting raises prices and profits inGill and Thanassoulis (2016).18 We are thankful to an anonymous referee for offering this concise explanation.19 Note that̂1 =̂2 so 12 = 0.…”

“…However, the comparison serves to develop the underlying economics that drive pricing and consumption across the two cases. The detailed derivations for the results in this section are found in the working paper version Jeitschko, Jung, and Kim ().…”

A Joint Optimal Model of Pricing, Rebate Value, and Redemption Hassle

“…For example, Cheng and Cryder (2018) found that consumers may benefit twice from a rebate (double mental discounting): once when they purchase the item and deduct the amount of the rebate from the retail price, and a second time when they actually receive the rebate. Future research may also consider alternative strategies to increase profits through rebates that are applied to bundle purchases (Popkowski Leszczyc & Häubl, 2010;Jeitschko, Jung, & Kim, 2017), or upgrade-rebate strategies used to stimulate sales for new generations of products, such as a new iPhone (Avagyan, Esteban-Bravo, & Vidal-Sanz, 2016).…”