2010
DOI: 10.1057/ejdr.2010.38
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Bumbling Bureaucrats, Sluggish Courts and Forum-Shopping Elites: Unending Conflict and Competition in the Transition to Private Property

Abstract: For close to two decades Maasai herders in Southwestern Kenyan have been struggling to subdivide their collectively held group ranches into individually owned and titled parcels. Scholars have indicated that conflicts over property assignment are resolved where more powerful individuals can either bear the costs of extended conflict or can credibly threaten retaliation. The conditions under which conflicts persist are less well understood, yet persistent, non-violent conflicts can have significant impacts on l… Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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References 42 publications
(36 reference statements)
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“…The key problem with the "Big Government" approach is the predominance of centralised government agencies in shaping NRM regimes. Such interaction between government agencies and resource users often result in patterns of resource use that are not sufficiently flexible to adjust to sudden shocks to the system, such as climate variability (Adger et al 2005;Mwangi and Ostrom 2008), or to excluding the influence of powerful interest groups appropriating rights to land and resources even when governments have dedicated programmes to protect local communities (Colfer and Capistrano 2005;Mwangi 2007Mwangi , 2010Larson et al 2010). …”
Section: Approaches To Integrating Cross-scale or Cross-level Coordinmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The key problem with the "Big Government" approach is the predominance of centralised government agencies in shaping NRM regimes. Such interaction between government agencies and resource users often result in patterns of resource use that are not sufficiently flexible to adjust to sudden shocks to the system, such as climate variability (Adger et al 2005;Mwangi and Ostrom 2008), or to excluding the influence of powerful interest groups appropriating rights to land and resources even when governments have dedicated programmes to protect local communities (Colfer and Capistrano 2005;Mwangi 2007Mwangi , 2010Larson et al 2010). …”
Section: Approaches To Integrating Cross-scale or Cross-level Coordinmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Th ird, while most of the classical literature supports the popular thesis that legal pluralism is characterized by competition between and among the multiple fora for power and authority (Berry 2002;Unruh 2003;Tamanaha 2008;Sikor and Lund 2009;Mwangi 2010;Van Leeuwen 2014, our case and our understanding of the situation in northern Uganda points towards cooperation rather than competition. Th e competition described by scholars ranges from what norms, rules and procedures should apply in confl ict resolution, to which organizations/institutions should be authorized to take charge under what particular circumstances (Van Leeuwen 2014).…”
Section: Th E Possibilities In Pluralismmentioning
confidence: 56%
“…Other studies looking at the social implications of land fragmentation, especially studies focusing on Maasai land subdivision, have highlighted how enclosure can cause significant conflict and social tension (Galaty 2005(Galaty , 2013Mwangi 2007bMwangi , 2010. Among the Maasai, the process of land subdivision itself has been rife with tension around decision-making, membership registration, land surveying, parcel allocations, and titling procedures.…”
Section: Re-creating the Commons?mentioning
confidence: 99%