Bullshit in Politics Pays

Gibbons, Adam F.

doi:10.1017/epi.2023.3

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 63 publications

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“…However, in what follows I primarily have in mind cases where people deliberately misapply the relevant concept. 20 See Gibbons (2023) for relevant discussion. also be exploited (Shields, 2021).…”

Section: Conceptual Exploitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering and the dynamics of linguistic intervention

Gibbons

2024

Inquiry

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Section: Conceptual Exploitationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conceptual engineering and the dynamics of linguistic intervention

Gibbons

2024

Inquiry

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“…But bullshitting agents do not decide to deliberately obscure (or fail to disclose) the facts they are acquainted with because it conflicts with their ends. Instead, the costs of engaging in serious truth-directed inquiry outweigh any benefits, and so they fail to become acquainted with the facts they represent themselves as knowing (Gibbons, 2023). Some of this bullshit is deliberate in the sense that it involves agents weighing up prospective costs and benefits of either engaging in truth-directed inquiry or directing their efforts elsewhere.…”

Section: The Rationality Of Inaccuracy Insincerity and Unclaritymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See alsoCappelen and Dever (2019: 52-72) andGibbons (2023).5 The recent philosophical literature on fake news is particularly notable in this regard. See e.g.,Levy (2017),Rini (2017), Gelfert (2018,Mukerji (2018), Blake-Turner (2020), the collection of articles inBernecker, Flowerree, and Grundmann …”

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Bad language makes good politics

Gibbons¹

2023

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Politics abounds with bad language: lying and bullshitting, grandstanding and virtue signaling, code words and dogwhistles, and more. But why is there so much bad language in politics?And what, if anything, can we do about it? In this paper I show how these two questions are connected.Politics is full of bad language because existing social and political institutions are structured in such a way that the production of bad language becomes rational. In principle, by modifying these institutions we can reduce the prevalence of bad language. However, as I show, such practical efforts are fraught with difficulties. After first outlining an account of bad language (Section 1), I examine the rationality of three different types of bad language: inaccurate language, insincere language, and unclear language (Section 2). Next, I discuss the possibility of implementing institutional reforms to improve the quality of political discourse (Section 3). However, I then outline and discuss two serious complications for institutional reforms-namely, they create risk of abuse, and they could preclude instances of seemingly bad language that, in fact, are socially beneficial (Section 4). I conclude with some thoughts about how to pursue institutional reform in an appropriately circumspect manner (Section 5).

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“…For example, perhaps the prevalence of political misinformation also explains some public political ignorance. SeeBenkler, Faris, and Roberts (2018),Brown (2018), O'Connor and Weatherall (2019),Fritts and Cabrera (2022),Lynch (2022), andGibbons (2023a;2023b) for relevant discussion.…”

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Political ignorance is both rational and radical

Gibbons

2023

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It is commonly held that political ignorance is rational, a response to the high costs and low benefits of acquiring political information. But many recent critics of the claim that political ignorance is rational instead urge that it is a simple consequence of agents not concerning themselves with the acquisition of political information whatsoever. According to such critics, political ignorance is inadvertent radical ignorance rather than a rational response to the incentives faced by agents in democracies. And since political ignorance is not a response to incentives, these critics urge, it cannot be ameliorated by incentivizing the acquisition of political information. This paper has two goals. First, I show that these seemingly competing accounts of political ignorance are in fact complementary, together explaining much political ignorance. Indeed, there is a sense in which political ignorance can be both rational and radical at the same time. Second, I more closely examine the relationship between incentives, kinds of political ignorance, and the acquisition of political information. On the one hand, from the fact that political ignorance is rational it does not follow that it can be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information.On the other hand, from the fact that political ignorance is radical it does not follow that it cannot be overcome by incentivizing the acquisition of information. Lastly, the complexity of the information in question is more relevant to determining whether ignorance can be overcome than whether such ignorance is rational or radical.

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Bullshit in Politics Pays

Cited by 7 publications

References 63 publications

Conceptual engineering and the dynamics of linguistic intervention

Conceptual engineering and the dynamics of linguistic intervention

Bad language makes good politics

Political ignorance is both rational and radical

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