Building up the EU Revenue Side: But What Is a Tax in EU Law?

Antón, Ricardo García

doi:10.17645/pag.v11i4.7176

PaG

2023

DOI: 10.17645/pag.v11i4.7176

|View full text |Cite

Building up the EU Revenue Side: But What Is a Tax in EU Law?

Ricardo García Antón

Abstract: While the US Constitution expressly grants the federation the power to tax, Article 311 TFEU is silent on whether such power exists at the EU level. This contribution argues that the Union has the power to tax, provided that the chosen resources in the basket match the objectives and policies of the Union. Since the achievement of the internal market is a shared competence (Article 4 TFEU), the Union can decide the level of resources tailored to this goal. Although the Union has a broad power to tax under Arti… Show more

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2023

Publication Types

Select...

Article3

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent3

Authors

Journals

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

No Borrowing Without Taxing? Fiscal Solidarity of Next Generation EU in Light of the American Experience

Woźniakowski

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article argues that the EU response to the pandemic, the Next Generation EU (NGEU), dubbed a “Hamiltonian moment” for Europe, can be better understood if compared to the US under the Articles of Confederation. The key aspect of the original Hamiltonian moment was the assumption of states’ debts after the Union was given tax power. None of this happened with the NGEU. The EU was not given any significant new sources of revenue, apart from some environmental levies, and was only allowed to borrow more on the financial markets to finance new fiscal solidarity mechanisms. In the US, this kind of borrowing power gave rise to monetary financing of the debt and enormous inflation. Instead of backing the enlarged borrowing powers with a fiscalization process leading to tax powers, the EU created a hybrid system of temporary, limited quasi-fiscalization in the form of the NGEU, which has legitimacy gaps. Simultaneously, the EU introduced enhanced fiscal regulation with conditionalities in the form of the new European Semester (an annual EU cycle of economic and fiscal coordination) tied to the allocation of the NGEU funds. Additionally, the EU has only promised to work in the future on various forms of revenue needed to pay the new debt. Hence, I will show that the NGEU could be better described as a “Morrisian moment” for Europe, as Robert Morris, the superintendent of finance of the US (1781–1784), was the very first finance minister of a similar kind of a union, with the power to borrow but no power to tax, governed by the unanimity rule in fiscal matters, which led to the failure of his proposals for national revenue.

show abstract

No Borrowing Without Taxing? Fiscal Solidarity of Next Generation EU in Light of the American Experience

Woźniakowski

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Revisiting Early Fiscal Centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community in Light of the EU’s Transfer Budget

Breuer

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The last few years have resulted in substantial changes for the EU’s fiscal powers, primarily through the introduction of the Next Generation EU funds. This article argues that the assessment of these developments as federalisation processes is based upon a central misunderstanding of the EU budget as a public goods budget in a federal state. The EU is a compound polity comprising of mature states, and its budget may be termed a “transfer budget,” which allows member states to predict budgetary costs and benefits. To understand the transfer-oriented nature of the budget, this article adopts a historical institutionalist lens. Revisiting the fiscal centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community allows us to understand how the six delegations agreed to combine economic and social aims in this budget, which was intended to serve the European Coal and Steel Community with similar elements to a public goods budget. Revenue consisted of debts and a levy on coal and steel produce, whereas expenditure ranged from investments to payments to individual workers. The Treaty of Rome, with its anti-supranational basis, triggered a critical juncture in Europe’s budgetary history: Since 1957, a transfer budget evolved. Revisiting the European Coal and Steel Community budget system allows us to understand the fiscal federal appearance of the Next Generation EU funds: While the EU makes new attempts to use its budget for the provision of common goods, its functions are limited by the institutional structure of the transfer budget.

show abstract

Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power

Woźniakowski,

Zgaga,

Fabbrini

2023

PaG

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This thematic issue examines two main research questions: What are the features, the determinants, and the implications of fiscal integration in a system of multilevel governance like the EU? And, what can the post-pandemic EU learn from established federations when it comes to fiscal integration? We attempt to conceptualize the patterns of EU fiscal integration. In so doing, we identify eight instruments of fiscal integration in a federal or multilevel polity, equally divided between fiscal capacity and fiscal regulation, depending on the side of the budget and the mode of integration (autonomous or dependent). For instance, as part of the fiscal capacity instrument of integration, we propose to distinguish between revenue and expenditure capacity. Revenue capacity is then further divided into tax capacity, based on EU/federal taxes, and budgetary capacity, based on non-independent sources, for instance, contributions from the member states. Expenditure capacity is divided into autonomous spending capacity, meaning direct spending by the EU, and a dependent transfer capacity, where the EU merely distributes resources (both grants and loans) to the member states.

show abstract

scite is a Brooklyn-based organization that helps researchers better discover and understand research articles through Smart Citations–citations that display the context of the citation and describe whether the article provides supporting or contrasting evidence. scite is used by students and researchers from around the world and is funded in part by the National Science Foundation and the National Institute on Drug Abuse of the National Institutes of Health.

Contact Info

customersupport@researchsolutions.com

10624 S. Eastern Ave., Ste. A-614

Henderson, NV 89052, USA

This site is protected by reCAPTCHA and the Google Privacy Policy and Terms of Service apply.

Blog Terms and Conditions API Terms Privacy Policy Contact Cookie Preferences Do Not Sell or Share My Personal Information

Made with 💙 for researchers

Part of the Research Solutions Family.

Building up the EU Revenue Side: But What Is a Tax in EU Law?

Cited by 3 publications

References 30 publications

No Borrowing Without Taxing? Fiscal Solidarity of Next Generation EU in Light of the American Experience

No Borrowing Without Taxing? Fiscal Solidarity of Next Generation EU in Light of the American Experience

Revisiting Early Fiscal Centralisation in the European Coal and Steel Community in Light of the EU’s Transfer Budget

Comparative Fiscal Federalism and the Post‐Covid EU: Between Debt Rules and Borrowing Power

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About