Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca

Kalpakian, Jack

doi:10.1080/10576100590905093

Cited by 9 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…In recent years, operatives have been connected to al-Qaida and its agenda in an even more informal way, having apparently not gone to camps or had much formal training: examples include those engaged in the London bombings of July 7 and 21, 2005, the Istanbul attacks of November 15 and 20, 2003, and the Casablanca attacks of May 16, 2003. 95 This loose connectedness is not an accident: bin Laden describes al-Qaida as "the vanguard of the Muslim nation" and does not claim to exercise command and control over his followers. 96 Although many groups boast of a connection to al-Qaida's ideology, there are often no logistical trails and thus no links for traditional intelligence methods to examine.…”

Section: Methods Of Recruitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups

Cronin

2006

International Security

192

104

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The war on terrorism might be perpetual, but the war on al-Qaida will end. Although the al-Qaida network is in many ways distinct from its terrorist predecessors, especially in its protean ability to transform itself from a physical to a virtual organization, it is not completely without precedent. And the challenges of devising an effective response over the long term to a well-established international group are by no means unique. Al-Qaida shares elements of continuity and discontinuity with other terrorist groups, and lessons to be learned from the successes and failures of past and present counterterrorist responses may be applicable to this case. Current research focuses on al-Qaida and its associates, with few serious attempts to analyze them within a broader historical and political context. Yet this context sheds light on crucial assumptions and unanswered questions in the campaign against al-Qaida. What do scholars know about how terrorist movements end? What has worked in previous campaigns? Which of those lessons are relevant to understanding how, and under what circumstances, al-Qaida will end? Radical Islamists will pose a threat to the United States and its interests for a long time to come. But there is a difference between sporadic and local acts of terrorism by religious extremists and the coordinated growth of al-Qaida, with its signature of meticulous planning, mass casualties, and global reach. A central assumption of early U.S. planning was that the elimination of al-Qaida would bring the war on terrorism (or the global struggle against violent extremism) to an end. Yet al-Qaida itself is a moving target, with experts arguing that it has changed structure and form numerous times. As a result, the strategy to counter this group is composed of tactics such as targeting its leader, Osama bin Laden, and his top lieutenants and denying the organization the ability, ªnances, and territory to regroup. Similar approaches have been employed against other terrorist organizations, with sharply varied outcomes. , and former colleagues and students at the U.S. National War College. The detailed comments of an anonymous reviewer were invaluable, and the Leverhulme Trust provided much-appreciated ªnancial support. The Decline and Demise of Terrorist GroupsCareful analysis of comparable situations can shed light on what is required to close out an epoch dominated by al-Qaida terrorism. Terrorism studies are often event driven, spurred by attacks and the need to analyze and respond more effectively to a speciªc threat. 1 As a result, the bulk of traditional research on terrorism has been descriptive analysis focused on one group, detailing its organization, structure, tactics, leadership, and so on. True to this pattern, since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there has been an outpouring of research (bad and good) on al-Qaida, but little attention to analyzing it across functional lines within a wider body of knowledge and research on terrorist groups. To the extent that broader crosscutting rese...

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Section: Methods Of Recruitmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups

Cronin

2006

International Security

192

104

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“…Uneducated or unemployed people have been heavily involved. For instance, Kalpakian (2005) and Kepel (2004b) have both identified the number of people belonging to poor backgrounds who were involved in the Madrid bombings. In the Palestinian territories poverty is endemic and services severely curtailed.…”

Section: Economic Development and Materialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Routes into 'Islamic' Terrorism: Dead Ends and Spaghetti Junctions

Vertigans¹

2007

Policing

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“…;Eickelman/Piscatori (1996);Ghazi (1997);Tozy (1999);Vermeren (2001). 11 Ben Rochd (2002; El Wardi (2003);Yassine (2003);Chaarani (2004);Kalpakian (2005);Zeghal (2005) with further literature.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Islamic Activism and Anti-terrorism Legislation in Morocco

Turner¹

2008

Sozialtheorie

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Building the Human Bomb: The Case of the 16 May 2003 Attacks in Casablanca

Cited by 9 publications

References 0 publications

How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups

How al-Qaida Ends: The Decline and Demise of Terrorist Groups

Routes into 'Islamic' Terrorism: Dead Ends and Spaghetti Junctions

Islamic Activism and Anti-terrorism Legislation in Morocco

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