Building biosecurity for synthetic biology

Trump, Benjamin D.; Galaitsi, Stephanie; Appleton, Evan; Bleijs, Diederik A.; Florin, Marie–Valentine; Gollihar, Jimmy; Hamilton, Ross A.; Kuiken, Todd A.; Лентзос, Филиппа; Mampuys, Ruth; Merad, Myriam; Novossiolova, Tatyana; Oye, Kenneth A.; Perkins, Edward J.; García-Reyero, Natàlia; Rhodes, Catherine; Linkov, Igor

doi:10.15252/msb.20209723

Cited by 30 publications

(21 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…In the future, as the technology to engineer biological systems becomes more accessible, the risk of any deliberate or accidental release of a pathogen or an engineered organism will also increase. 177 Moreover, the growing reliance on biological data, especially sequence information, in medical and manufacturing applications makes future bio-based industries prone to "bio-hacking" through data breaches. 84 While the synthetic biology community is making relentless efforts to continue to advance synthetic biology, the discussion on regulations also needs to be applying new technologies.…”

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…84 While the synthetic biology community is making relentless efforts to continue to advance synthetic biology, the discussion on regulations also needs to be applying new technologies. 177 Currently, the standards for biosafety and biosecurity regulations are highly variable even within a single country. 183 Experts are calling for more regional and even global harmonization and collaborations.…”

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…183 Experts are calling for more regional and even global harmonization and collaborations. 177,178,184 For instance, in the face of a novel pathogen, coordinated real-time communication and data sharing across borders will make biosecurity surveillance and response more effective. 184 In order to achieve this, it is important to have researchers and regulators from different countries align their understanding of the benefits and risks of synthetic biology, and lay out common frameworks for synthetic biology regulations and biosecurity surveillance.…”

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Entering 2020, the COVID‐19 pandemic again reminded us of the importance of biosecurity ‐ when a new pathogen emerges, it brings catastrophic damage to public health and the economy that has no regard for borders. In the future, as the technology to engineer biological systems becomes more accessible, the risk of any deliberate or accidental release of a pathogen or an engineered organism will also increase 177 . Moreover, the growing reliance on biological data, especially sequence information, in medical and manufacturing applications makes future bio‐based industries prone to “bio‐hacking” through data breaches 84 .…”

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Future trends in synthetic biology in Asia

et al. 2021

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Synthetic biology research and technology translation has garnered increasing interest from the governments and private investors in Asia, where the technology has great potential in driving a sustainable bio-based economy. This Perspective reviews the latest developments in the key enabling technologies of synthetic biology and its application in bio-manufacturing, medicine, food and agriculture in Asia. Asia-centric strengths in synthetic biology to grow the bio-based economy, such as advances in genome editing and the presence of biofoundries combined with the availability of natural resources and vast markets, are also highlighted. The potential barriers to the sustainable development of the field, including inadequate infrastructure and policies, with suggestions to overcome these by building public-private partnerships, more effective multilateral collaborations and well-developed governance framework, are presented. Finally, the roles of technology, education and regulation in mitigating potential biosecurity risks are examined. Through these discussions, stakeholders from different groups, including academia, industry and government, are expectantly better positioned to contribute towards the establishment of innovation and bioeconomy hubs in Asia.

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Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Mitigating Risksmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Future trends in synthetic biology in Asia

et al. 2021

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“…Many emerging biosecurity dilemmas, such as the malicious use of synthetic biology, require new approaches to biosecurity, including the engagement of social scientists and policy-makers in forecasting [ 10 ]. This is a step in this direction by having a diverse group of scholars, practicioners and policy-makers collaboratively contemplate the most pressing current and future challenges in biosecurity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

80 questions for UK biological security

et al. 2021

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Multiple national and international trends and drivers are radically changing what biological security means for the United Kingdom (UK). New technologies present novel opportunities and challenges, and globalisation has created new pathways and increased the speed, volume and routes by which organisms can spread. The UK Biological Security Strategy (2018) acknowledges the importance of research on biological security in the UK. Given the breadth of potential research, a targeted agenda identifying the questions most critical to effective and coordinated progress in different disciplines of biological security is required. We used expert elicitation to generate 80 policy-relevant research questions considered by participants to have the greatest impact on UK biological security. Drawing on a collaboratively-developed set of 450 questions, proposed by 41 experts from academia, industry and the UK government (consulting 168 additional experts) we subdivided the final 80 questions into six categories: bioengineering; communication and behaviour; disease threats (including pandemics); governance and policy; invasive alien species; and securing biological materials and securing against misuse. Initially, the questions were ranked through a voting process and then reduced and refined to 80 during a one-day workshop with 35 participants from a variety of disciplines. Consistently emerging themes included: the nature of current and potential biological security threats, the efficacy of existing management actions, and the most appropriate future options. The resulting questions offer a research agenda for biological security in the UK that can assist the targeting of research resources and inform the implementation of the UK Biological Security Strategy. These questions include research that could aid with the mitigation of Covid-19, and preparation for the next pandemic. We hope that our structured and rigorous approach to creating a biological security research agenda will be replicated in other countries and regions. The world, not just the UK, is in need of a thoughtful approach to directing biological security research to tackle the emerging issues.

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