Buddhist Nationalism, Authoritarian Populism, and The Muslim Other in Sri Lanka

Abstract

146 ISJ 6(2)3 Key characteristics of Protestant Buddhism include the rise of lay activism and authority with the attendant decline of the Buddhist sangha (clergy); emphasis of the rational, scientific character of Buddhism; critique of Christian and Western influences, while adopting norms and forms of organization of Protestant Christianity; and a deeper focus on the "scriptural" textual authority (Blackburn 2010, 199). 4 The Moors are an ethnic minority group in Sri Lanka, initially comprised of Ceylon Moors and Coast Moors, although this distinction collapsed under a common Muslim identity following the 1915 anti-Muslim riots (Ali 2014, 303).5 "Locative pluralisms" refer to the deployment of discourse tailored to respective audiences and spaces. In Ceylon, the Buddhism that concerned Dharmapala was more a social and political formation, than a world religion; in India, his Buddhism was perfectly compatible with Hinduism, just as his British Buddhism was comfortable with Christianity, with a place for both the Hindu Gods and the Christian God (Kemper 2015, 427). 6 Ancient Ceylon was divided into three regions: Ruhunu, Maya, and Pihiti. 7 These anxieties were formerly in relation to the ethnic Tamils in Tamil Nadu. 8 We see this feature later as well, in the context of the civil war between the State and ethnic Tamil separatists. Nationalist discourse played up the proximity of the large capitalist State of Tamil Nadu and its Tamil demographics, which essentially made the Sinhalese a minority in this extended geography. 9 Ali (2014) locates several waves of anti-Muslim attacks in the post-independence years, including the 1976 Puttalam riots, expulsion and massacre of Muslims from the North by the LTTE in 1990, and incidents of sporadic anti-Muslim violence in the 2000s. 10 These refer to the Hindutva movement in India and Myanmar's 969 Movement. 11 The pie chart referred to her shows the demographic breakdown as Muslims-29.73%, Tamils-33.43%, Sinhalese-24.99%, and Others-1.86%. This, however, only applies to the Colombo municipality, and not the larger Colombo district, where the Sinhalese remain a majority in numbers.12 "Sinhale" refers to a new name for the country that Buddhist nationalist groups like the BBS are pushing for. Sinhale represents an imagined State where the nation and the Sinhalese race are synonymous (Jones 2015, 39).

The Integration of Liberal Democracy in Sri Lanka

“…Through these discussions, the government should ultimately enact legislation focused on equal representation, a method that successfully addressed each group's concerns and subsequently decreased tensions under the Sirisena administration. Especially with already re-emerging "public discontent over the economic and health fallouts," as mentioned by Rajni Gamage (2021) from the University of Queensland, western countries have limited funding to pressurize Sri Lanka to handle the situation efficiently and prioritize long-term peace (p. 145). In order to minimize this conflict and fully rehabilitate relations between Sinhalese and Tamils, "leaders need to rise above ethnic and religious politics" to improve Sri Lanka for the current and future generations (Gunaratna, 2018, p. 4).…”

Carrying the cross for justice: Digital traces of victimhood in Sri Lanka

“…Victimhood claims in the digital space have received little attention among scholarly circles in Sri Lanka and South Asia. Most studies on victimhood approach the concept through populist political discourses or media-centric analysis (Chakravartty & Roy, 2015Gaul, 2021;Gamage, 2021). Both approaches highlight the constructed and mobilized nature of victimhood narratives.…”

“…The identification of victimhood perpetuated by right-wing populist rhetoric in Sri Lanka bears a connection with the decades long war in the North-east in Sri Lanka between the government forces and the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Ealam. Although the war ended in 2009, the political rhetoric of the populist right-wing in Sri Lanka drew from those animosities to appeal to the people (Yilmaz & Morieson, 2022;Gaul, 2021;Gamage, 2021). Gaul analyzing seventy speeches delivered by the former President Mahinda Rajapaksa from 2005 to 2015 identifies that the "representations … perpetuate the simplified dichotomy of victims and perpetrators" (2020, p. 103), with us in opposition to the terrorist other (p. 102).…”

“…Inevitably, Facebook became a space where support and dissent for carrying the cross were negotiated while giving voice to citizens' dissent by merging with the ongoing protests against the government. The victimhood frames emerging through the digital space during the study from April 21 to the beginning of May 2022 coincided with the justice narrative of those seeking justice and redress for the victims, the threat-based and largely weaponized victimhood narrative of the right-wing politics (See Gaul, 2020;Gamage, 2021;Yilmaz & Morieson, 2021) as well as the emerging disgruntlementsolidarity narrative of the people's protest. The Facebook coverage essentially captured the fragmented narratives of rival victimhood.…”