Broadening the perspective on ocean privatizations: an interdisciplinary social science enquiry

Schlüter, Achim; Bavinck, Maarten; Hadjimichael, Maria; Partelow, Stefan; Said, Alicia; Ertör, Irmak

doi:10.5751/es-11772-250320

Cited by 17 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…Land–water–sea connectivity is an important governance issue for many coastal earthen pond systems due to the material fluidity of aquaculture 45,182 . In the Philippines, effluent leading to polluted waterways effects both local capture fisheries and continued aquaculture production 95 .…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing aquaculture commons

Partelow

Schlüter

Manlosa

et al. 2021

Reviews in Aquaculture

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Knowledge of the shared resources—or commons—that aquaculture systems rely on, and the appropriate rule and norm systems to govern them—or institutions—is far behind other natural resource use sectors. In this article, we provide a conceptual framework for identifying the social and environmental commons creating collective action problems for aquaculture governance. Collective action problems, or social dilemmas, create problems for governing shared resources because the typical strategies for individual use (maximisation; free riding) are often divergent from broader group interests (e.g. fair contributions; sustainable use). This framework helps identify two types of collective action problems in aquaculture: first‐order (direct use and provision of commons) and second‐order (provision, maintenance and adaptation of institutions to govern commons). First‐order aquaculture commons with governance challenges include water quality, water quantity, physical space, inputs, genetic diversity, mitigating infectious disease, earth and climate stability, infrastructure, knowledge and money. Second‐order institutions govern the use of first‐order commons. These include rule and norm systems that structure property rights and markets, aiming to better align individual behaviour and collective interests (e.g. sustainability goals) through governance. However, which combination of institutions will fit best is likely to be unique to context, where aquaculture has important differences from capture fisheries and agriculture. We provide four case examples applying our conceptual framework to identify existing aquaculture commons, institutions and governance challenges in Peru (mariculture), the Philippines (earthen ponds), Nepal (raceways) and Denmark (recirculation).

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governing aquaculture commons

Partelow

Schlüter

Manlosa

et al. 2021

Reviews in Aquaculture

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“…A 2018 study revealed that 12,998 genetic sequences based on MGRs associated with patents -mostly held by private companies such as BASF, which holds 47% of MGR patents worldwide (Blasiak et al 2018, p. 2). This concentration of rights goes hand in hand with the privatisation of marine space and knowledge, which is aggravated by a lack of consensus on, and regulation of ownership, access to, and benefit-sharing of MGRs in international waters (Schlüter et al 2020).…”

Section: Marine Biodiversity In the High Seas: A Common Heritage?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Many point out that the CHP conflicts with the 'Freedom of the High Seas' (FOS), or mare liberum, principle granting all states, whether coastal or landlocked (UNCLOS Article 87), free access to international waters (Drankier et al 2012, Leary andJuniper 2014). Yet, others show that high-seas MGRs are already being privatised by the biotechnology sector, and argue that a robust legal framework would increase transparency and reduce global imbalances (Jaeckel 2013, Blasiak et al 2018, Schlüter et al 2020). An equitable access and benefit-sharing instrument has been proposed, similar to the one for seabed minerals, to ensure that profits derived from MGRs are equally shared amongst all states (Broggiato et al 2014, Laird et al 2020.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Who owns marine biodiversity? Contesting the world order through the ‘common heritage of humankind’ principle

Vadrot

Langlet

Wysocki

2021

Environmental Politics

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The governance of marine biodiversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction (BBNJ) lacks a legal framework that would ensure the conservation and sustainable use of the oceans. In order to fill this gap, governments have been negotiating a new treaty under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Negotiations have been afflicted by polarisation between two principles: The 'Freedom of the High Seas' (FOS) and the 'Common Heritage of Humankind' (CHP). Instead of discussing the CHP from a purely legal perspective, we examined, through an ethnographic lens, how it has become a practice of contestation: it is used as a tool and negotiation technique to challenge deeply rooted inequalities in the current world order. The CHP could make a difference if it was integrated into the text as a general principle committing all states to protect and preserve BBNJ for future generations -regardless of their imminent economic value as commercial assets.

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“…Here, our aim is to suggest new directions, after first clarifying old ones, for a multidisciplinary audience (following the example of Schlüter et al 2020). We draw on literature at the intersection of adaptive water governance and common-pool resource governance, a field with a nearly 40-year history of interdisciplinary research on collective action to govern shared natural resources.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The mode of inquiry is patterned after recent contributions seeking to broaden conceptual perspectives in environmental governance, such as privatization in the oceans (Schlüter et al 2020) and telecoupling in environmental governance (Newig et al 2020). Like these recent examples, we seek to clarify important concepts, identify measurement challenges, and explore the governance implications of phenomena historically treated as external factors.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Markets and misfits in adaptive water governance: how agricultural markets shape water conflict and cooperation

Garrick¹,

Alvarado-Revilla²,

Loë³

et al. 2022

E&S

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Agricultural trade poses dilemmas for adaptive water governance as farmers and irrigation systems become integrated into global food value chains and are affected by their ongoing dynamics. The benefits and risks of agricultural trade and agrarian transitions are unevenly distributed, giving rise to complex interdependencies and externalities. Despite these growing linkages, the understanding of agricultural markets and their influence on water conflict and cooperation remains limited and dependent on context, which can lead to seemingly contradictory evidence. Progress has been hampered by boundary problems, disputed concepts, measurement issues, and divergent normative perspectives. Addressing these challenges will require that water governance scholars account more explicitly for agricultural trade when diagnosing collective action problems and assessing different modes of adaptive water governance. Drawing on the common-pool resource governance literature, we distinguish three separate, but interrelated, conceptual perspectives examining agricultural trade as an external factor in water governance: (1) market integration as a disturbance, (2) market integration as an opportunity, and (3) agricultural trade as a form of telecoupling with nested externalities. We compare these perspectives in terms of the externalities involved, their major claims about the relationship between market integration and collective action in the context of irrigation governance, and the broader implications for adaptive water governance. The comparison demonstrates the prevalence of institutional misfits and the common struggle of boundary shifting, i.e., matching water governance to the expanding problem-shed associated with agricultural markets. Institutional fit offers one important lens through which to consider the shifting boundaries (and actors) relevant for water governance, the scope and limits for strengthening fit through social learning, and the importance of nested governance to address nested externalities. These insights point the way for an agenda of research that examines the evolution of agricultural trade and adaptive water governance and pays explicit attention to the politics and power relations that shape who wins and loses and the different levers and entry points to improve management of the associated transitions and tradeoffs. We conclude by arguing that future research should identify and examine pathways of adaptive water governance that strengthen processes of social learning and institutional nesting to address the external pressures and opportunities created by global food value chains.

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Broadening the perspective on ocean privatizations: an interdisciplinary social science enquiry

Cited by 17 publications

References 68 publications

Governing aquaculture commons

Governing aquaculture commons

Who owns marine biodiversity? Contesting the world order through the ‘common heritage of humankind’ principle

Markets and misfits in adaptive water governance: how agricultural markets shape water conflict and cooperation

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