Broadening the Perspective on Military Cohesion? A Reply

Abstract

In 2018, Ilmari Käikhö published a special collection in Armed Forces & Society on the debate about small unit cohesion. Later, in reaction to a response by Guy Siebold, he published a further intervention with Peter Haldén. Focusing on my 2006 article in the journal and my subsequent debate, Käikhö has claimed that the cohesion debate is too narrow. It ignores organizational factors in the armed forces and wider political factors, including nationalism and state policy. Consequently, it is incapable of analyzing non-Western state or irregular forces and is only relevant for the 20th and 21st centuries. This response shows that while Käikhö’s extension of the empirical archive to non-Western armed groups is to be welcomed, none of his theoretical claims are sustainable.

Toward Strategic Cohesion: A Reply to King’s Criticism of the Call for a Broader View of Cohesion

“…I agree with King's (2020) view that every inquiry must limit its scope (p. 6). It is consequently surprising that he defends his work in a manner that appears to maintain its claim to universal validity.…”

“…It appears inconceivable that training and drill constituted the primary independent variables in the case of the ATU. King's (2020) retort that the ATU's poor combat performance can be explained by its lacking "political motivation, primary group solidarity, or training" (p. 7) suggests that he too recognizes the problem. Yet one wonders whether this broadening of his past argument now elevates political motivation and primary group solidarity to equal explanatory strength previously enjoyed by training alone.…”

“…King therefore sidesteps the question whether different circumstances-including our own-require cohesion to be constructed and studied in different ways (Käihkö & Haldén, 2020, p. 519). King's (2020) claim that I accuse him of ignoring macrolevel factors altogether is unfounded (p. 5). I cannot find this claim in the special issue, nor does he provide a reference for one.…”

“…The reason for this is straightforward. According to King (2013), the special issue overlooked his study on The Combat Soldier and ignored its broader analytical framework that King (2020) believes explains cohesion even in premodern, nonstate, and non-Western armed groups. I want to thank King for his comments and welcome this opportunity to continue this debate about an important topic.…”

“…The first reason is simple. As King acknowledges in his criticism, The Combat Soldier “is organized around the historic transition from mass, citizen armies to a professional, all-volunteer forces” (King, 2020, p. 4; see also Siebold et al, 2016) and focuses on microlevel squads and platoons (King, 2013, p. 15). As the subtitle of the book— Infantry Tactics and Cohesion in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries —makes clear, King’s study focuses on 20th- and 21st-century Western armed forces, more specifically ground forces.…”