Broadcasting good news and learning from bad news: Experimental evidence on public managers' performance information use

Abstract

This article argues and shows that performance narratives affect how and for what purposes managers use performance information independently of other known drivers of performance information use, such as the external environment and individual intra-and interorganizational characteristics. Using a survey experiment on 514 Danish public school managers, we find an asymmetrical effect of "decline narratives" (declining performance) and "increase narratives" (improving performance). In line with expectations drawing on literature on negativity bias and blame-avoidance, we find that "decline narratives" lead to higher internal use (learning and control purposes) of performance information. In contrast, "increase narratives" lead to higher external use (giving account and building support purposes) of performance information. Further exploratory analysis suggests that internal use is not affected by narratives when managers are skeptical of the performance measure. More skeptical managers are, however, willing to use performance information with an "increase narrative" for external use.

Exploring Managerial Attitudes Toward Various Participation Mechanisms in Response to Citizen Satisfaction Signals on Public Service Quality

“…However, the finding that managers are more inclined to make performance information available to the public can seem counterintuitive when the results are negative. A recent study finds that public school managers are less likely to use performance information when performance is negative, while they are eager to share positive performance information (Mikkelsen et al, 2021). There might be two possible explanations in the counterintuitive finding.…”

Information use in public administration and policy decision‐making: A research synthesis

“…Lindblom's (1959) theory of incrementalism, or successive limited comparisons, builds a framework of policy change based on limited information seeking, or rather, information seeking only at the margin. Fast forward half a century, and we find ourselves inundated with new applications for big data, fueled by rapid growth in technological capacity and a performance movement that values collecting data to inform management (Andersen & Moynihan, 2016; Desmidt & Meyfroodt, 2023; Kroll, 2015a; Mikkelsen et al, 2022; Moynihan, 2015; Pandey, 2015; Vogel & Hattke, 2018). Since the turn of the millennium, the policy making elite have developed a new infatuation with science, calling for increased use of evidence to inform policy decisions at nearly every turn.…”

“…In other words, the variability of key aspects of information being considered when data use is concerned is high, with just a handful of features recurring more frequently. The most frequent features being studied are: information content (19 studies focused on that feature alone, and 6 additional articles investigate content in conjunction with other information features) (e.g., Bel et al, 2021; Blom‐Hansen et al, 2021; DeLeo & Duarte, 2022; Harrits, 2019; Hong & Kim, 2019; Mizrahi & Minchuk, 2020; Walker et al, 2018; Wang & Niu, 2020) and information purpose (18 studies) (e.g., Choi & Woo, 2022; George & Desmidt, 2018; Korac et al, 2020; Meyfroodt & Desmidt, 2021; Micheli & Pavlov, 2020; Nitzl et al, 2019; Ruijer et al, 2023; Tantardini, 2022), followed by evidence‐based information (16 studies with exclusive focus and 1 study with an additional focus) (e.g., Hall & van Ryzin, 2019; Head, 2016; Petty et al, 2018; Turner et al, 2022; Wagner et al, 2021), information relativity (16 studies) (e.g., George, Baekgaard, et al, 2020; Holm, 2017; Hong et al, 2020; Petersen et al, 2019; van der Voet & Lems, 2022), information availability (10 studies) (e.g., Boer et al, 2018; Wit & Bekkers, 2020), and framing of information (10 studies interested on framing alone and an additional study interested on its framing and purpose) (e.g., Belardinelli et al, 2018; Mikkelsen et al, 2022; Porumbescu et al, 2021).…”

Negativity bias in welfare policy feedback effects on mass publics

“…Meanwhile, public administration and public policy academics have used this negativity bias notion to explain the reactions of citizens and policymakers to information on public performance (Baekgaard et al, 2019;Deslatte, 2020;George et al, 2020;Hong, 2019Hong, , 2020Hong & Kim, 2019;James, 2011;James & Moseley, 2014;Mikkelsen et al, 2021;Moynihan, 2016;Nielsen & Moynihan, 2017;Olsen, 2015) and bureaucrats' behaviors that tend toward avoiding blame (Charbonneau & Bellavance, 2012;Hong et al, 2020;Nielsen & Baekgaard, 2015;Weaver, 1986). In general, the literature demonstrates that the mass public and politicians react significantly negatively to negative performance information and not very positively to positive performance information (James et al, 2020;James & John, 2007).…”