Britain, Poland and the Eastern Front, 1939

Abstract

This book offers a revisionist interpretation of British foreign policy towards Poland and the role of the Anglo-Polish relationship during the period March-September 1939. It challenges and questions hitherto held views on the British determination to defend Poland and oppose German expansion eastwards. It includes a study of foreign policy, economic policy and military planning. This book is a major contribution to our knowledge of the outbreak of the war because it contains a unique and original study of the role of the Poles in British proposals for an eastern front and the Polish perception of their relationship with Germany. Finally the inconclusive nature of British approaches to the Soviet Union and the Rumanian government are put into the context of the abortive proposal for an eastern front against Germany.

Carton de Wiart’s Second Military Mission to Poland and the German Invasion of 1939

“…Chamberlain had given Hitler a public warning. 19 Alistair Parker wrote that 'The guarantee to Poland was a political not a military event . .…”

Have the options really changed? British defence policy in the twentieth century

“…69 The Polish guarantee failed in part because the British lacked both the means and the will to give the Poles direct military assistance. 70 The Singapore deterrent failed because the Royal Navy simply did not have enough capital ships to spare to dispatch to the Far East in 1941. 71 But even more important was the fact that the deterrents which failed sent misleading political signals to Britain's potential enemies.…”