Bringing politics back in: rethinking the role of economic interest groups in European integration

Grossman, Emiliano

doi:10.1080/1350176042000248061

Cited by 57 publications

(31 citation statements)

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“…Others have shown that financial lobbying became more Brussels-centric and favourable to market integration over the course of the 1990s and 2000s (Grossman 2004;Mügge 2010;Quaglia 2008b). This helped supranationalize the agenda-setting phase of the regulatory process, although the ECB's thwarted attempt to expand its supervisory powers is an indication that large member states could keep controversial issues off the negotiating table when it suited them.…”

Section: The Lamfalussy Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?

McPhilemy¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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This article examines the integration of prudential banking regulation and supervision in the European Union. It demonstrates that incremental integration in the two decades preceding the sovereign debt and banking crisis produced a regulatory process that afforded member states wide discretion when it came to implementing European rules at the national level. Decentralized implementation was an aggravating factor in the partial disintegration of the Single Market in financial services since 2008. The recently agreed 'Single Rulebook' and 'Single Supervisory Mechanism' reduce the scope for home bias in the implementation of European rules, thereby shifting the regulatory process in banking closer towards an idealized 'end-point' of outright supranational governance. However, change is taking place within an increasingly complex regulatory environment that is shaping the outcome of reform. One consequence is that national discretion in some important prudential areas will persist.

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Section: The Lamfalussy Eramentioning

confidence: 99%

Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?

McPhilemy¹

2014

Journal of European Public Policy

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“…Eising (2004) finds that groups that are unable to gain access at the domestic level see that pattern reinforced at the supranational level. Grossman (2004) argues that there are barriers to EU-level activity and therefore it should not be assumed that organized interests will automatically mobilize at the supranational level. Presenting evidence from the banking sector, he showed that national-level organized interests focused on the national level of governance, hanging back from targeting the supranational institutions during the debates on economic monetary union (EMU) and the Single European Act (SEA).…”

Section: Evolving State Structures and The Locus Of Advocacymentioning

confidence: 99%

Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and America

Mahoney¹,

Baumgartner²

2008

West European Politics

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The European and American literatures on lobbying and interest groups developed largely separately in previous decades. Scholars developed different research foci with Europeans more commonly rooted in studies of policy systems and Americans more concerned with precise tactics of lobbying or on the membership calculus following from the work of Mancur Olson.Recent developments in the study of interest groups in Europe suggest that the literatures have begun to be much more closely aligned, a development that can be expected to accelerate in the future. We focus on three major points of convergence, giving illustrations and empirical evidence from the literature on each. First is the impact of governmental structures on the growth and development of national interest-group systems. Using examples from the US and the EU, we discuss the coevolution of groups and the state. Looking both over time and across issue-domains, groups are more active when and where the state is more active. Second, we look at the impact of government structures on the locus of advocacy. Originally explored in the U.S. context, multi-level governance structures in European settings have led to consideration of the concept of venue-shopping. Finally, we discuss the impact of government structures on advocacy behaviors, showing how groups in both systems adjust their lobbying strategies to their political context. Our review of findings and empirical developments in these three areas of interest-group research suggests that the study of groups, long divided by different perspectives may begin to benefit from substantially more convergence of research interests.2

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“…also Grossman 2004). The goal of this new strand of research is to identify the opportunities and constraints that make up the institutional logic of interest intermediation in the EU.…”

Section: Towards An Institutional Analysis Of Interest Intermediationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lobbying in the European Union: Fromsui generisto a comparative perspective

Woll

2006

Journal of European Public Policy

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Bringing politics back in: rethinking the role of economic interest groups in European integration

Cited by 57 publications

References 0 publications

Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?

Integrating rules, disintegrating markets: the end of national discretion in European banking?

Converging Perspectives on Interest Group Research in Europe and America

Lobbying in the European Union: Fromsui generisto a comparative perspective

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