Bringing Policy Communities Back In: The Case of Fire Service Cover

Abstract

It is argued that the concept of a policy community has an enduring value in the analysis of public policy, especially if an emphasis is placed on the way in which ideas are excluded from debates. Historical analysis based on the National Archives using a political science conceptual framework can offer fresh perspectives. The concept is developed through a specification of the conditions that encourage policy community formation and survival. Policy inertia led to a policy that produced a higher rate of deaths from fire in the UK than in other developed countries, especially among the socially excluded. The policy community concept can be of value in the policy analysis tool-kit, especially if policy frames that have become embedded to the exclusion of alternatives are identified.

Beyond Policy Networks: Policy Framing and the Politics of Expertise in the 2001 Foot and Mouth Disease Crisis

“…Marsh and Rhodes' typology of policy networks fails to explain the policy outcomes of the 2001 MFD crisis. As recent case studies have demonstrated, the term ‘policy community’ retains its utility as a descriptive tool (for example, Grant 2005). However, very few examples can be found of cases which closely resemble either the policy community or issue network model.…”

Mainstreaming social finance: The regulation of the peer-to-peer lending marketplace in the United Kingdom

“…This process occurred in a context where participation in the industry was limited to a relatively small sector of society making regulation a matter of low political salience, where there was limited understanding of the technical aspects of the industry, and where there was initially little appetite on the part of regulators to supply it. As an issue of low political salience with a technical character where there has been reasonably narrow social demand for and institutional supply of regulation, the case meets many of the criteria for regulatory capture outlined in the literature (Grant, 2005; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Pagliari, 2012; Tsingou, 2010). 6…”

“…These include asymmetries of information between the regulated industry and regulators and society more broadly, a lack of widespread public interest in regulation in a given sphere, the apparently technical nature of the subject of regulation, as well as particular institutional and political contexts (Grant 2005 instance, noted that his firm 'is very much in favour of having its activities incorporated into the regulatory framework where regulation is appropriate and proportionate, because this will be extremely beneficial in building the kind of trust that is necessary for platforms such as ours to succeed'. Rhydian Lewis (Interview 11/7/13) likewise noted that Ratesetter sees an important place for regulation, because it 'will give more confidence, the fact that there's a hygiene factor', and that as a result it favoured regulation because 'ultimately […] people expect it [and] the right regulation does add value and is the right thing to do.…”

“…It is broadly accepted that there are some common conditions that lead to the formation of policy communities, which can result in policy monopolies or regulatory capture. These include asymmetries of information between the regulated industry and regulators and society more broadly, a lack of widespread public interest in regulation in a given sphere, the apparently technical nature of the subject of regulation, as well as particular institutional and political contexts (Grant, 2005; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Pagliari, 2012; Tsingou, 2010). In particular, Mattli and Woods (2009: 5) have suggested that the tendency for regulatory capture can be thought of as a function of the relationship between the institutional supply of and social demand for regulation.…”

“…First, the transition from self-regulation to formal regulation in the P2P lending sector can be interpreted as an instance of ‘regulatory capture’ characterised by a degree of elite collusion. To make this case, we engage with literature outlining the conditions under which influential policy communities are formed and regulatory capture is understood to occur ( inter alia Grant, 2005; Mattli and Woods, 2009; Pagliari, 2012; Tsingou, 2010), and suggest that core conditions for capture can be identified in the case of the emerging P2P sector. Second, the key outcome of the regulatory moment was performative, reflecting the view that regulations not only manage but also render objects as governable (Aitken, 2015: 132).…”