Bringing back intrinsics to enduring things

Abstract

Bringing back Intrinsics to Enduring Things I. Persistence and temporary intrinsicsIn the mid-eighties, David Lewis developed an argument for perdurantism that has since become known as the argument from 'temporary intrinsics' (roughly, those properties that are temporary inasmuch as they are gained or lost and intrinsic inasmuch as they are had by things just in virtue of how they are, regardless of their relations with anything else). The argument has prompted an extensive and ongoing discussion, in spite of the fact that Lewis's presentation of the point is extremely laconic, taking the form of a short passage in a famous volume devoted to a presentation and defense of his realistic approach to modality 1 . Lewis's aim in developing the argument was to establish a close connection between the problem of persistence across time and the problem of qualitative change. The intended conclusion of the argument is that, either things persist by having different temporal parts at different times or it is a mystery how persistent things can change their intrinsic properties across time.The structure of the argument is simple. First, a problem is described. Persistent objects have incompatible intrinsic properties at different times, for example they are bent at one time and straight at another. How can the bent thing existing at one time and the straight (i.e., non-bent) thing existing at another be one and the same? Second, no more than three possible solutions to the problem are envisaged. 1) Eternalist endurantism: intrinsic properties of persistent things are disguised relations they bear to times. Being straight and bent at different times is like being tall and short by comparison to different people. 2) Presentism: the only properties things have are those they have now. And nothing can be both bent and straight now. 3) Perdurantism: persistent things are made up of temporal parts. A thing can only be bent and straight at different times by having distinct temporal parts that have the incompatible properties. Third, two of the envisaged solutions are showed to be untenable. Eternalist endurantists turn intrinsic properties (e.g., shapes) into relations to times, which is a confusion: 'if we know what a shape is, we know that it is a property, not a relation' (Lewis 1986, p. 204). Presentists believe that no times exist except the present and so they 'reject persistence altogether', which 'goes against what we all believe' (ib. p.204). So the conclusion is: either intrinsic change is inexplicable, or perdurantism is true.There are a number of ways the argument may turn out inconclusive. First, the list of solutions might be incomplete. For example, Lewis does not consider stagism as a possible solution to the problem; if stagism were true, persistent objects would not be sums of their temporal parts. Second, the rejected solutions might fail to have the purported unpalatable consequences. For example, it might be denied that presentists are bound to rejecting persistence altogether or that eternalist endurantists...

The Situationalist Account of Change

“…Andrea Bottani (2016) offers a response to Lewis's temporary intrinsics argument which invokes indeterminacy in an attempt to maintain that things have properties simpliciter. His intentions are somewhat aligned with mine, as Bottani recognises the need to uphold a straightforward relationship between objects and properties as well as proposing radical indeterminacy as a way of retaining this.…”

The Disappearance of Change: Towards a Process Account of Persistence

“…12 "Relations to times are exactly the sort of relations that may plausibly count as intrinsic" (Haslanger 2003: 330). Adverbialism is another strategy to re-establish the intrinsicness of temporary properties (Johnston 1987, Lowe 1988, van Inwagen 1990, Haslanger 1989a, but it remains controversial whether it is a successful strategy (Merricks 1994, Hinchcliff 1996, Lewis 1988and 2002, Sider 2001, Bottani 2016.…”