Brexitland

Sobolewska, Maria; Ford, Robert

doi:10.1017/9781108562485

Cited by 170 publications

(117 citation statements)

References 241 publications

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“…This came to an abrupt halt from 2010, as the welfare reforms started to bite, marking the onset of the populist backlash. While a host of economic mechanisms may contribute to the growing skill bias in the economy, 1 the patterns are very consistent with this paper's central argument, which suggests that austerity was key to activating these existing grievances, and to producing the sentiment that ultimately culminated in the Brexit vote.…”

supporting

confidence: 81%

“…First, I estimate a difference-in-differences specification to study how support for UKIP distinctly grew after 2010 in areas more exposed to cuts across local, European and Westminster elections. I further explore an event study design similar to specification (1), where I replace the measure X i,baseline with a measure the exposure of district i to welfare reform j , Austerity i, j . Further, I study a specification allowing me to estimate local multipliers.…”

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

Fetzer

2019

American Economic Review

306

206

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This paper documents a significant association between the exposure of an individual or area to the UK government’s austerity-induced welfare reforms begun in 2010, and the following: the subsequent rise in support for the UK Independence Party, an important correlate of Leave support in the 2016 UK referendum on European Union membership; broader individual-level measures of political dissatisfaction; and direct measures of support for Leave. Leveraging data from all UK electoral contests since 2000, along with detailed, individual-level panel data, the findings suggest that the EU referendum could have resulted in a Remain victory had it not been for austerity. (JEL D72, F15, F60, H53, I38)

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supporting

confidence: 81%

Section: Empirical Strategymentioning

confidence: 99%

Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

Fetzer

2019

American Economic Review

306

206

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We also control for the respondent's Leave/Remain vote in the 2016 EU referendum. The relationship between economic, social and political grievances and people's 2016 votes is widely debated (see Sobolewska and Ford, 2020, for a summary). However, the fact that this study took place in a context where the referendum was the last salient electoral event in voters' minds means that Remainers could behave like typical political "losers" and show greater dissatisfaction.…”

Section: Multivariate Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Trust in the “Places That Don't Matter”

2021

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A popular explanation for the recent success of right-wing populist candidates, parties and movements is that this is the “revenge of the places that don't matter”. Under this meso-level account, as economic development focuses on increasingly prosperous cities, voters in less dynamic and rural areas feel neglected by the political establishment, and back radical change. However, this premise is typically tested through the analysis of voting behavior rather than directly through citizens' feelings of political trust, and non-economic sources of grievance are not explored. We develop place-oriented measures of trust, perceived social marginality and perceived economic deprivation. We show that deprived and rural areas of Britain indeed lack trust in government. However, the accompanying sense of grievance for each type of area is different. Modeling these as separate outcomes, our analysis suggests that outside of cities, people lack trust because they feel socially marginal, whereas people in deprived areas lack trust owing to a combination of perceived economic deprivation and perceived social marginality. Our results speak to the need to recognize diversity among the “places that don't matter,” and that people in these areas may reach a similar outlook on politics for different reasons.

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“…However, the issue of Brexit became emblematic of a deeper cultural divide between what Sobolewska and Ford label 'identity conservatives' and 'identity liberals' which is, they convincingly argue, the key animating cleavage in British electoral politics today. 18 The Conservatives under Johnson have successfully positioned themselves as the representatives of the former group, squeezing out competition from the likes of UKIP, while identity liberals have been more fractured between different parties. The 'culture wars' the Conservatives under Johnson have engaged in-targeting, amongst others, the universities, the BBC, and 'wokeness' (the term often disparagingly used to dismiss attempts to raise questions of racial and/or social justice)-are part of a deliberate strategy aimed at sustaining the identity conservative coalition and ensuring 'that debates about patriotism and social cohesion are conducted on right-wing terms'.…”

Section: Boris Johnson's Statecraftmentioning

confidence: 99%

Conservative Party Statecraft and the Johnson Government

Hayton¹

2021

Political Quarterly

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This article uses the statecraft framework outlined by Andrew Gamble to analyse the Conservative government of Boris Johnson. It argues that under Johnson, the Conservative Party is pursuing its most far‐reaching statecraft strategy since the Thatcher era, aimed at re‐establishing the conditions for Conservative hegemony. At the heart of Johnson's statecraft lies Brexit itself, which serves as a national cause around which to organise the politics of support. Leaving the EU demands a renewal of the national community which, for the Conservatives, is framed as a narrow Anglo‐Britishness, centred on an essentially English understanding of the Union of the United Kingdom and of Britishness itself. This assertive politics of national identity shapes the party's approach to territorial statecraft and its ideological struggle to ensure that the dominant narratives of British politics are once again Conservative ones.

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Brexitland

Cited by 170 publications

References 241 publications

Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

Did Austerity Cause Brexit?

Political Trust in the “Places That Don't Matter”

Conservative Party Statecraft and the Johnson Government

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