Brexit Domino? The Political Contagion Effects of Voter-endorsed Withdrawals from International Institutions

Abstract

This article examines the systemic implications of the growing popular backlash against international cooperation and analyzes how voter-endorsed attempts to withdraw from international institutions reverberate abroad. Observing other countries’ disintegration experiences allows voters to better assess the feasibility and desirability of such withdrawals. More positive withdrawal experiences encourage exit-support abroad, whereas negative experiences are likely to have a deterring effect. These contagion effects will be conditioned by the availability of information and voters’ willingness to learn. The article empirically examines this argument for the case of Brexit. It leverages original survey data from 58,959 EU-27 Europeans collected in six survey waves during the Brexit withdrawal negotiations and from a two-wave survey of 2,241 Swiss voters conducted around the first Brexit extension in spring 2019. It finds both encouragement and deterrence effects, which are bigger when respondents pay attention to Brexit and are dampened by motivated reasoning.

The Backlash Against Globalization

“…For example, informing individuals about the increasing use of capital controls by other countries makes them more supportive of restrictions on international financial flows (Steinberg et al 2020). Regarding backlash against political globalization, several studies document that voters who think that Brexit is going well for the United Kingdom are significantly more likely to support an EU exit for their own country (De Vries 2017;Walter 2020Walter , 2021. Electoral successes of radical parties and candidates such as Donald Trump legitimize their views and thus encourage those sharing these views to support them more openly (Bischof & Wagner 2019, Bursztyn et al 2017.…”

“…For example, the EU-27 governments have consistently refused to accommodate Britain's requests to enjoy many of the benefits of EU membership while being freed of its obligations after Brexit. Such nonaccommodation is costly, but it counters the globalization backlash by reducing support for it (Chopin & Lequesne 2020;Walter 2020Walter , 2021Walter et al 2018). Countries willing to cooperate have also tried to work around policy backlash and to uphold cooperation.…”

Methods for analysing citizens’ attitudes: a hypothetical Italian referendum about the membership of the European Union as a case study

“…Recent studies show how more positive withdrawal experiences encourage exit-support abroad, whereas negative experiences are likely to deter (Walter 2020 ). These contagion effects impact EU membership and its long‐term stability, increasing the Eurosceptic view if the perception of Brexit negotiations is as being positive for the UK, allowing the development of a blueprint that makes it easier for countries to leave the EU in the future (Walter 2021 ).…”

“…In this context, although the UK is an outlier when it comes to exit scepticism (Hobolt 2016 ) and there are different reasons why people would like to leave the EU in different countries (De Vries 2018 ; Ejrnæs and Jensen 2019 , 2021 ), the UK’s 2016 vote to exit is the first real example shedding light on the consequences of the intensifying Eurosceptic sentiment (De Luca 2019 ). Since then, the fear of a likely ‘contagion’ in other countries (Walter 2020 , 2021 ) has persistently spread to the point of worrying Rome seriously.…”

Switzerland‐EU Relations. Lessons for the UK after Brexit?PaoloDardanelli and OscarMazzoleni (eds.) Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge (2021), 224 p., ISBN: 9780367482053

“…Of course, the book opens up the Swiss‐centrist perspective by exploring in depth how the Swiss case can and does inform post‐Brexit UK‐EU relations. Yet, rather than giving the UK an opportunity to learn from the Swiss experience, Brexit arguably exerts an even stronger effect on Swiss‐EU relations as it affects both the EU’s willingness to accommodate Swiss demands and Swiss voters’ attitudes and vote‐intentions in EU‐related referendums (Malet and Walter 2021; Walter 2021). Not considering these feedback effects is a lost opportunity.…”