Brentano and the Buck-Passers

Danielsson, Sven; Olson, Jonas

doi:10.1093/mind/fzm511

Cited by 109 publications

(48 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…For present purposes, this lacuna in the literature need not concern us. The most extensive discussion of the notion of a correctness reason appears in Danielsson and Olson (2007). Nonetheless, that correctness provides reasons serves as a premiss rather than a conclusion in their arguments.…”

Section: The Truth-correctness Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Important related discussions appear in Booth (2014aBooth ( & 2014b and Reisner (2008Reisner ( & 2015, and Reisner and Van Weelden (2015). ⁵⁴ See Danielsson and Olson (2007) and Reisner (2009) for the 'eyes on the prize' argument in favour of treating the incentives as direct pragmatic reasons for belief. ⁵⁵ John Skorupski has articulated this view in some detail in Skorupski (2011).…”

Section: The No Positive Normative Judgement Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Reisner

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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In some circumstances, a wedge may be driven between what is advantageous or beneficial to believe and what is true. Cases range from the exotic—with diabolical forces conspiring to punish a hapless victim for believing the truth—to the mundane—with excessive optimism increasing one’s chances of success at some tasks. In contemporary discussions about normative reasons for belief, it is often argued or assumed that all reasons for belief arise only from epistemological considerations. This chapter assesses the case for the contrary claim: that there are genuine pragmatic reasons for belief. The chapter begins with a discussion of the standard arguments for and against non-ecumenical evidentialism. After concluding that case for non-ecumenical evidentialism is tenuous, the chapter canvasses and assesses the diverse range of arguments in favor of there being pragmatic reasons for belief.

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Section: The Truth-correctness Principlementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The No Positive Normative Judgement Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Reisner

2018

Oxford Handbooks Online

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“…40 42 However, since holding-reasons are understood in terms of content-reasons (so that there being a holding-reason to favour X means that there is a content-reason to favour favouring X), the Brentano-style analysis implies that hedonistic act-consequentialism is committed to the claim that there is a reason to favour bringing about pleasure. But what sort of favouring could this possibly be?…”

Section: Some Worries Concerning the Brentano-style Solution To Thmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…But it is unclear on what grounds they reject it. They do not offer any arguments of their own against it, but refer instead to two works which they take to show that it is untenable: 10 Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, 'Buck-Passing and the Right Kind of Reasons', 11 and Lang, 'The Right Kind of Solution'. However, none of these works contains any argument against this kind of approach in general.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Right Version of ‘the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’

Samuelsson¹

2013

Utilitas

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“…Au cours des dernières années, plusieurs auteurs se sont tournés vers une analyse de la valeur en termes d'attitudes appropriées (fitting-attitude analysis) (Scanlon, 1998;Rabinowicz et Rønnow-Rasmussen, 2004;Danielsson et Olson, 2007). En ce qui concerne le cas non comparatif, l'analyse de la valeur en termes d'attitudes appropriées soutient qu'une chose est bonne si et seulement si elle est l'objet approprié d'une attitude favorable.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

Rossi

2014

ateliers

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Comment pouvons-nous analyser des relations de valeur non standards, comme la parité axiologique, en termes d’attitudes appropriées? Wlodek Rabinowicz suggère que deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est à la fois permissible de préférer l’une à l’autre et permissible d’avoir la préférence contraire. Dans un article récent, Johan Gustafsson soutient toutefois que l’analyse de Rabinowicz viole un principe de symétrie entre valeurs et préférences, selon lequel il existe pour toute relation de valeur une relation de préférence correspondante (et vice-versa). À la lumière de ce principe, Gustafsson propose une analyse alternative, selon laquelle deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est requis d’entretenir ces choses en parité préférentielle. Dans cet article, j’examine en détail les arguments avancés par Gustafsson contre l’analyse de Rabinowicz et je montre qu’aucun d’eux n’est convaincant.How can we analyse non-standard value relations, such as axiological parity, in terms of fitting attitudes? Wlodek Rabinowicz has suggested that two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite preference. In a recent paper, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz’s account violates a principle of value-preference symmetry, according to which for any value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation (and vice-versa). Following this principle, Gustafsson has proposed an alternative analysis, according to which two items are on a par if and only if one is required to hold these items preferentially on a par. In this paper, I examine in detail Gustafsson’s arguments against Rabinowicz’s analysis and show that none of them succeeds

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Brentano and the Buck-Passers

Cited by 109 publications

References 12 publications

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

Pragmatic Reasons for Belief

The Right Version of ‘the Right Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem’

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

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