Brazilian Corruption Overseas: The Case of Odebrecht in Angola

Alencastro²

2020

Global Society

Self Cite

From 2003, President Lula heralded a new dawn in Brazil's expanding African relations. Brazil was claimed to be unlike other exploitative powers because of its cultural, geographic and historic connections; Africa's true brother. Despite the passing of two decades and a number of scandals, this narrative of exceptionalism remains. Studies on Brazil-Africa relations tend to focus on the Brazilian state as the key, essentially benign agent. Our analysis uses the case studies of Angola and Tanzania to debunk the idea of Brazilian exceptionalism. We demonstrate the significant, overlooked agency of corporations in shaping and implementing Lula's Africa Policy, and determining its developmentally dubious outcomes. Additionally, the paper shows how political elites in Africa directed Brazilian government and companies into their political and business norms. Thus, Brazil-Africa relations replicated much of the typical economic patterns of the continent's trade, with oft-controversial and corrupt investment in commodity extraction and infrastructure.

Section: : the Corporate Turnmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Symbiosis Between Odebrecht and The Angolan Ruling Elitementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Symbiosis Between Odebrecht and The Angolan Ruling Elitementioning

confidence: 99%

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Debunking Brazilian Exceptionalism in its Africa Relations: Evidence from Angola and Tanzania

Alencastro²

2020

Global Society

Self Cite

“…Lula also increased the scale of finance for corporate operations in Africa. Under his direction, from 2007 BNDES extended credit for various projects, which amounted to an accumulated US$2 billion by 2012 (Carmody, 2013) and reached a total of $12.6 billion for export services, largely consisting of infrastructure projects (Alencastro, 2019;Fernandes & Neder, 2019). He also pushed for Brazil to become what Carmody (2013) cites as the largest developmentcooperation spender by 2010: the budget for Brazil's Development Cooperation Agency (ABC), increased significantly under Lula, with total development-cooperation spending moving from $120 million in 2006 to $1.2 billion in 2010.…”

Section: Presidential and Corporate Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…While not the initiators of the Brazil-Africa vision, infrastructure and resource-extractive companies were key agents shaping and implementing the PT's Africa policy. Companies like Odebrecht, Camargo Correa, Queiroz Galvão, Petrobras and Vale had some experience, primarily of lusophone Africa and were increasingly seen by the PT as agents capable of delivering the Brazil-Africa agenda (Dye & Alencastro, forthcoming;Dye, 2018;Alencastro, 2019). Petrobras for instance, brokered many of its own deals, arriving in Tanzania before the embassy reopened in 2005.…”

Section: Presidential and Corporate Agencymentioning

confidence: 99%

What Holds Back Dam Building? The Role of Brazil in the Stagnation of Dams in Tanzania

2020

SSRN Journal

Across Africa, a number of major dam projects have been resurrected, often with the backing of the so-called emerging powers. However, many are yet to reach construction and are stuck in the early phases of implementation, with studies ongoing. This paper examines this issue in Tanzania, where eight dam projects were pursued between 2005 and 2017 yet only one reached construction. Beyond the literature on anti-dam activists, there is little analysis of the more technical, financial and policy-making processes that cause such stalling of dam projects. Therefore, this paper focuses on the Brazilian government and two companies, Odebrecht and Queiroz Galvão, as the international enablers of two dams in Tanzania, the Stiegler's Gorge and Mnyera projects. It demonstrates the significance of two drivers in undermining these dams construction. One was the inconsistency resulting from Brazil's heavily presidential foreign policy that oscillated from strong support for Africa relations and infrastructure projects between 2010-2012, to a withdrawal of diplomatic and financial support since. The second driver was the degree to which Brazilian governmental and private sector actors misread Tanzanian politics, not understanding the degree of fragmentation in the ruling party and how this affected policymaking. These two factors help explain why the widespread resurrection of dam projects has not entailed an equal boom in dam construction. Additionally, the paper makes a secondary contribution to understanding the factors behind the collapse in Brazil-Africa relations over the last decade, particularly beyond a core group of Lusophone countries.

Brazil’s Boom and Bust in Tanzania: A Case Study of Naivety?

Brazil-Africa Relations in the 21st Century

2020

Brazil experienced a dramatic see-saw in relations with Africa in the first two decades of the 21 st Century. Booming ties in diplomacy, development cooperation and trade saw Brazil established as a major partner for the continent under the leadership of Lula's PT administration. Subsequent governments increasingly dismantled many of the policies supporting this boom. However, this collapse, and what it signifies about Brazil's Africa relations, is still little understood and more widely, there are few detailed case studies of this trend. This chapter tackles both gaps with a study of Brazil-Tanzania, which mirrored the wider boom and bust. Its analysis demonstrates the degree to which the spread of ties beyond Lusophone countries was state-initiated, with diplomacy playing a central role, but then implemented by companies, who shaped what occurred 'on the ground'. This created a weakness in Brazil-Africa relations, given Brazil's presidential system and its influence over foreign policy priorities and development cooperation spending. Additionally, the chapter introduces the concept of naivety amongst Brazilian actors, as a misreading of Tanzanian politics prevented infrastructure companies from establishing projects. However, the chapter concludes by arguing that any understanding of Brazil-Africa must appreciate the crucial role of African agency. As demonstrated here by Tanzanian politicians and government officials, countries on the continent fundamentally shape the processes, activities and successes of Brazilian involvement.