Brazil and the Responsibility While Protecting Initiative: Norms and the Timing of Diplomatic Support

Protection or Interference? The Legitimacy of Contemporary Humanitarian Interventions and the Engagement of Nonhegemonic Powers

“…Nevertheless, this did not resonate sufficiently with global actors to lead to its complete adoption. Without pleasing Western powers, because it was aimed at more rigorous control of criteria for trigging international action, or pleasing contesting countries, given its appearance of reinforcing the possibility of interference (Benner 2013), the Brazilian formulation failed to make a significant impact on prescriptions for the operationalisation of interventions (Kenkel and Martins 2016;Kenkel and Stefan 2016). One reason why this proposal was so short-lived was the difficulty in formulating norms for international responsibility beyond those supporting the imperative of force (Benner 2013).…”

Norm internalisation revisited: Norm contestation and the life of norms at the extreme of the norm cascade

“…Instead, as Wiener explains, regular and institutionalised access is necessary. Indeed, Brazil used its platform as a non-permanent Security Council member to advance RwP but once its tenure was over so did its commitment and ability to articulate its interpretation of R2P (Kenkel and Stefan 2016). In turn, because the use of amnesties in Uganda has widespread support 44 they should be part of a productive and inclusive dialogue regarding the meaning of the anti-impunity norm in the context of the Rome Statute.…”

Explaining emerging powers’ reluctance to adopt intervention norms: normative contestation and hierarchies of responsibility

“…On intervention in particular, emerging powers such as India (Destradi 2017b) and Brazil (Kenkel 2012(Kenkel , 2010 have historical normative commitments that are at odds with the proactive use of military force, especially in a remedial form applied to others and divorced from their own causal responsibility. Yet these states are strong supporters of multilateral institutions -first and foremost the United Nations -which increasingly link responsible conduct to the use of military force (Kenkel and Stefan 2016;Schweller 2011;Patrick 2010). This is particularly evident in UN peace operations, where most missions are now mandated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, and by the UN's endorsement of R2P.…”

“…On the one hand, Brazil abstained on UNSC Resolution 1973, thereby contributing to its approval, but the Brazilian Permanent Representative highlighted her government's concerns about the potential unintended effects of the use of force. By crafting the "responsibility while protecting" (RwP) concept note (Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations 2011), however, the Brazilian government showed a high degree of initiative as compared to other emerging powers (and thereby, a non-reluctant approach), but the initiative ended prematurely (Kenkel and Stefan 2016).…”

“…This is one major difference as compared to Brazil, which made an attempt to develop an own definition of responsibility. While India endorsed the principles of RwP, it did not attempt to further develop the norm after the Brazilian government had de facto abandoned it (Kenkel and Stefan 2016). Nor has India been willing or able to provide alternative ideas or initiatives on how to deal with genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity (Destradi 2017b, 232).…”