Brain Data in Context: Are New Rights the Way to Mental and Brain Privacy?

Abstract

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to "mental privacy." In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are-at least for now-no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum's "contextual integrity" theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts-healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.

Epistemic Challenges in Neurophenomenology: Exploring the Reliability of Knowledge and Its Ontological Implications

“…Exploring subjective experiences through analyzing neural data raises important ethical concerns that require thoughtful consideration. As researchers investigate the intricate relationship between brain activity and subjective phenomena, it is essential to prioritize participants' privacy and informed consent and minimize any potential harm or distress [108,109]. Preserving the privacy and autonomy of research participants is paramount in any scientific study, including neurophenomenology research [110][111][112].…”

Cuaderno n.º 2. Mens iura fundamentalia: la neurotecnología ante la Constitución

“…Una cuarta objeción se ha presentado al hilo de que las neurotecnologías, en realidad, no serían tan diferentes de otras tecnologías de recopilación de datos como la vigilancia en línea o las herramientas de secuenciación genética, de forma que es preciso conocer más a fondo los problemas de privacidad que plantean los datos cerebrales en un contexto de mayor amplitud. Por ello, Susser & Cabrera, (2023), una vez examinados los flujos de información en diferentes contextos -la atención sanitaria y la investigación médica, la justicia penal y el marketing de consumo-, concluyen que los argumentos que defienden la necesidad de nuevos derechos para proteger la privacidad mental carecerían de fundamento, puesto que centrar la atención en lo que distingue a los datos cerebrales de otros tipos de información personal, en lugar de en sus puntos en común, no sería útil. En primer lugar, desde el punto de vista teórico, tratar de entender las implicaciones de los datos cerebrales para la privacidad únicamente en términos del tipo de información que son, sin tener en cuenta el contexto, es basarse en una teoría anticuada de la misma.…”

Ethical considerations for integrating multimodal computer perception and neurotechnology

“…Should this capacity be accurately and reliably realized, patients risk losing control and autonomy over the disclosure of their private, subjective experience. Importantly, the unique methods and capabilities of computer perception technologies may violate privacy both in the traditional sense (relating to data security and identification noted above) but also in a newer, deeper sense, violating what scholars now refer to as "mental privacy" (Wajnerman Paz, 2021;Farahany, 2023;Susser and Cabrera, 2023). These new types of threats have recently gained attention in the neuroethics literature, with scholars calling for "neurorights" (Yuste et al, 2017) to mental integrity, privacy and cognitive liberty (Bublitz, 2013;Shen, 2013;Ienca, 2017;Ienca and Andorno, 2017;Lavazza, 2018;Farahany, 2019;Jwa and Poldrack, 2022;Wajnerman Paz, 2022).…”