How do securitising actors, in this case governments, go about de-securitising policy issues that have been securitised across multiple referent objects? Do such de-securitisations develop as a single or manifold process and with what political effect? These are pertinent questions that have been left underexamined in the (de)securitisation literature. In seeking to fill this gap, the aims of this article are twofold. Firstly, it calls for a greater focus on what happens in such cases, whereby the de-securitization process encompasses the multiple referent objects initially securitized. Secondly, it considers the case of Russia's policy of normalization towards Chechnya since 2000, as an exemplary case-study to illustrate the politics at play in the nature and practice of de-securitizations, especially if and how this plays out across multiple referent objects. This article argues for a more process-centered and longitudinal approach to the study of the security politics of (de)securitisations, especially as actors go beyond the singular-act of a securitizing move and towards the much broader consideration of managing and counteracting a particular security threat.