Border settlement and the movement toward and from negative peace

Owsiak, Andrew P.; Diehl, Paul F.; Goertz, Gary

doi:10.1177/0738894216650420

Cited by 30 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 33 publications

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“…More than this, a border violation, in isolation, does not carry the same type of implicit threat to the regime. Variation in the underlying certainty of a border provides a straightforward dichotomy between types of contestations, and, when combined with the location of the territory in dispute, provides the basis for my classification system (for more of a discussion on border certainty, see Owsiak et al, 2016).…”

Section: What States Fight Over—types Of Territorial Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What they fight for: Specific territorial issues in militarized interstate disputes, 1816–2001

Gibler

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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This paper provides a multifaceted classification of the primary issue for each state involved in territorial disputes between 1816 and 2001. I differentiate principally between cases in which ownership of the territory is disputed and cases over which status quo distributions of territory are acknowledged. I also consider the location of disputed territories-homeland vs other territories-and the types of actions in the dispute. This classification scheme produces categories such as (1) disputed ownership, (2) general border issues, (3) opportunity-based conflict, (4) state-system changes, (5) border violations, and (6) fishing rights and the hot pursuit of rebels. My analyses find that there is significant variation across types of territorial disputes, and serious conflicts are overwhelmingly concentrated in fights over bordering territories with disputed ownership claims. I suggest several ways in which this classification scheme can be used in future research. Keywords Issue typology, militarized interstate disputes, territorial conflictThe Correlates of War (CoW) Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset divides conflicts among four specific issue codes-territory, policy, regime/government, and other.1 This division has proven to be important since a substantial number of studies have demonstrated that territorial issues are more difficult to resolve, more likely to repeat, more prone to fatalities, and more likely to cause wars than other types of issues.2 Nevertheless, this simple distinction between territory and other types of issues still masks a great deal of variation within each category but especially among the broad category of territorial disputes.Many familiar war cases began as territorial disputes-the First Gulf War (MID3957), the Falklands/Malvinas War (MID3630), Nagorno-Karabakh (MID3564), and World War II (MID0258)-but this category also includes some rather bizarre historical events that were coded as militarized incidents. Just a few examples include the 1893 incident in which FrenchCorresponding author: Douglas M. Gibler, University of Alabama, Box 870213, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA. Email: dmgibler@ua.edu troops fired on British troops in West Africa, thinking they were fleeing members of the Sofa tribe (MID2300); the French very quickly apologized for their mistake. Or, in 1842, US Commander Jones misread newspaper reports and thought Mexico was aiding the British, so he sailed to Monterrey and took the city in the name of the United States, only to give it back two days later after he realized his mistake (MID2116). More recently, MID1367 codes cattle rustling by Ugandan troops against Kenya in 1973, and MID4237 describes a similar incident by South African forces directed at Lesotho in 1994. Each of these are territorial disputes in the dataset resting alongside the major territorial wars of the last two centuries.Even a focus on the territorial wars reveals substantial heterogeneity across the cases. The First Gulf War was a broad coalition fighting against Iraq's invasion...

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Section: What States Fight Over—types Of Territorial Issuesmentioning

confidence: 99%

What they fight for: Specific territorial issues in militarized interstate disputes, 1816–2001

Gibler

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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“…Unfortunately, as leaders turn away from accommodative bargaining strategies, mistrust only deepens on both sides and militarization of the relationship occurs. Policy actions taken by rival governments consequently are viewed as threatening and deceitful (see Owsiak et al, 2016).…”

Section: The Fragility Of Democratic Conflict Resolution?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…That rivalry and territorial contention push states toward armed conflict is unsurprising (see Owsiak et al, 2016). 12 Rivalry generates deep mistrust that precludes compromise and frustrates credible commitment, while territorial incompatibility provides the underlying issue in dispute supporting military action.…”

Section: The Fragility Of Democratic Conflict Resolution?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Not only does strategic rivalry delineate a hostile dyadic relationship, but also evidence currently demonstrates that regime type may not make much difference in rival contexts (Lektzian et al, 2010). Furthermore, it might be possible to organize interstate relationships along a continuum of interactions that help to identify relationships where, for example, while the frequency and severity of violent conflict decline, the perception of threat remains (see Owsiak et al, 2016). Therefore, to specifically address whether regime type affects conflict propensity, we need to consider the overall external security environment that could limit democratic pacifism and the larger continuum of interstate relationships.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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External threat and the limits of democratic pacifism

Ghatak

Gold

Prins

2016

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Scholars widely recognize that democratic dyads are associated with lower hazards of armed conflict and more efficient conflict resolution. Many attempts have been made to challenge the notion of democratic pacifism, but perhaps the most significant is the argument that the Democratic Peace is epiphenomenal to territorial issues, specifically the external threats that they pose. The presence of an external threat might be the mechanism by which democratic dyads, owing to audience costs and resolve, fail to decide contentious issues non-violently. This study seeks to answer the question: “Under what conditions do democratic dyads lower the likelihood of armed conflict?” To do this we propose a hard test of the Democratic Peace. Using an updated global sample of cases, we model joint democracy’s ability to lower the likelihood of armed conflict in the presence of direct external threats in the form of strategic rivalry and territorial contention. The empirical evidence we uncover systematically shows the Democratic Peace to be more limited than previously observed. When we control for each external threat with a simple right-hand-side variable, joint democracy continues to reduce conflict propensities. But when democracies face external threats (i.e. the interaction of democracy and threat), the pacifying effect of democracy is less visible.

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“…If research by Ghatak et al and Bell shows that the presence of a territorial claim enhances threat and subsequently increases the likelihood of armed conflict, Andy Owsiak, Paul Diehl, and Gary Goertz (Diehl et al, 2017) explore the effects of removing such issues from dyadic relationships. They do so using a new framework that classifies interstate relationships along a full continuum from highly hostile and individualistic to highly friendly and integrated (Goertz et al, 2016).…”

Section: Contents Of the Special Issuementioning

confidence: 99%