Bondholder’s Trustee

Bazzana, Flavio

doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-7883-6_78-1

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...

Literature Review1

Citation Types

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Year Published

2019

Publication Types

Select...

Article1

Relationship

Self Cite0

Independent1

Authors

Journals

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 12 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Therefore, there is a trade‐off between the inefficiencies of inflexible bond covenants and the agency costs arising from hiring an intermediary. Furthermore, the legal literature (Bazzana, ; Schwarcs & Sergi, ) agrees that the appointment of a trustee is a more efficient option because this intermediary could facilitate coordination of strategies among investors and mitigate costly individual investor actions.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trustee reputation in securitization: When does it matter?

2019

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider the role of trustees–who are nominated to protect the interests of investors–in securitization pricing and whether investors rely on them to mitigate risks. In particular, we examine the effect of trustee reputation on initial yield spreads of European mortgage‐backed security (MBS) issuances between 1999 and the first half of 2007. We find that engaging reputable trustees led to lower spreads during the credit boom period prior to the 2007–2009 financial crisis. Our findings suggest that trustees’ reputation was considered by investors to be more important when risk assessment became more challenging.

show abstract

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%