Bolivia's soy complex: the development of ‘productive exclusion’

The politics of agrarian change in Bolivia's soy complex

“…In the case of the soy complex in Bolivia, wage labour on the farm is almost obsolete, forcing smallholders to find non‐farm rural employment or become innovative entrepreneurs through cooperative project initiatives. In contrast to de Janvry's original conceptualization of functional dualism, the Bolivian context is characterized by the coexistence of capitalist agriculture and smallholder rentiers whose subsistence needs are not primarily derived from own production but from the appropriation of rent via the partida arrangement (see McKay and Colque, ). Not fully divorced from the land, smallholders therefore do not become fully proletarianized yet lack the necessary access mechanisms to fully benefit from the fruits of their land.…”

“…The law prohibits any forms of forced labour or unpaid services, while also allowing “popular movements, departmental and municipal authorities, indigenous federations, unions, and communities to participate in saneamiento reversion, expropriation, and land granting” themselves, empowering rural populations by enabling their direct participation in the reform process (Valdivia, , p. 74). Although the Agrarian Revolution has led to some progress in terms of formalizing land tenure and recognizing indigenous territorial rights, it has failed to dismantle the prevailing unequal agrarian structure which continues to exclude and marginalize the majority of the population and most particularly small‐scale and peasant farmers (Colque, Tinta, & Sanjinés, ; McKay & Colque, ). The so‐called Agrarian Revolution is better understood as tenurial reform than redistributive land reform.…”

“…In previous drafts of the CPE developed with the social movements of the CONALCAM, “it was decided that no one, by any means, could have landholdings larger than 5,000 hectares” (Francescone, , p. 68). The final version of the CPE states that the land ceiling is not applied retroactively (meaning existing landholdings over 5,000 ha are legal) and that the 5,000‐ha land ceiling applies to each individual associate (meaning a company can easily fix its associate to land ratio), effectively rendering the land ceiling inapplicable (McKay & Colque, , p. 597). The unaltered legalization of genetically modified (GM) soybean seeds, and the more recent legislation which increases deforestation limits (Law 741); “excuses” previous unauthorized deforestation (Law 739); and extends regulatory inspections for the FES from 2 to 5 years (Laws 740) reveals the government's interest in facilitating agro‐industrial expansion.…”

“…But even through the association, farmers are still subordinated vis‐à‐vis agro‐industry and enter into relations of debt and dependency (McKay, ; McMichael, ). Instead, many rely on collecting either land rents or rural wage labour as they are excluded from the production process (McKay & Colque, ).…”

“…Despite these shortcomings, we cannot dismiss the importance of the advances made in recognizing indigenous territories (TCOs) and preventing the consolidation of what Colque et al call speculative estates ( latinfundio especulativo ). Similarly, we cannot ignore the fact that the agrarian structure has been left largely unchanged as new forms of marginalization, exclusion, and debt relations exacerbate existing rural inequalities (McKay, ; McKay & Colque, ). As a result, new processes of social differentiation have led to contradictory class positions among the smallholders who have been excluded from the production process, enabling a state–capital alliance to persist by means of a functional dualism between the class fractions of capital and labour (de Janvry, ).…”