Blurred roles and elusive boundaries

Abstract

Purpose -The purpose of this paper is to extend research on contemporary forms of oversight surrounding professional work in an era characterized by increased skepticism regarding professional claims and the rise of independent regulatory authorities. The authors investigate the interplay between key actors as well as the shifting role boundaries in a distinct regulatory space, following the introduction of a new public oversight framework. Design/methodology/approach -The analysis draws on the notions of regulatory space and boundary work to better understand the development of independent audit oversight in France. The authors adopted an interpretive approach to conduct a longitudinal case study based on 33 interviews and documentary data produced from 2003 to 2012. Findings -The study provides a narrative of the boundary work carried out by the French audit profession as it tried to reinvent its role in the new regulatory order. In the case, boundary work engendered a hybrid regulatory pattern, named "co-regulation," reflecting both the logic of independent regulation and the logic of self-regulation. The main consequence of this is that zones of mutual involvement were constructedthereby suggesting that to become a reality, independent oversight of professional work needs to accept some operational dependence from professionals. Originality/value -The study illustrates the elusiveness of boundaries surrounding actors' role within contemporary forms of professional regulation. More generally, hybrid development suggests that professions are proactive and, to some extent, successful when it comes to developing alliances and manipulating changes within their regulatory space.

U.S. Auditors' Perceptions of the PCAOB Inspection Process: A Behavioral Examination

“…Second, our consideration of U.S. auditors' perspectives provides insight into how inspection process characteristics might influence the work performed by auditors in the current environment and, in turn, impact inspection results. 2 In doing so, our study responds to calls for more research on the PCAOB inspection process (Malsch and Salterio 2016) and complements existing studies that provide detailed insights into the regulation of public accounting firms in the United States and other jurisdictions (Malsch and Gendron 2011;Canning and O'Dwyer 2013;Dowling et al 2018;Glover et al 2019;Hazgui and Gendron 2015; 1.…”

“…Audit regulation outside the United States Much of prior research on audit regulation outside the United States has interpreted regulation and regulatory compliance through the lens of institutional-based theories of power and professionalism in which regulation is a complex and dynamic process between accounting firms and regulators (e.g., Cooper and Robson 2006;Suddaby et al 2007;Malsch and Gendron 2011). As this dynamic process unfolds during the creation of independent regulation, regulatory oversight and compliance can take various forms, depending on contextual factors in the jurisdiction (Canning and O'Dwyer 2013;Hazgui and Gendron 2015). For instance, both Malsch and Gendron (2011) and Hazgui and Gendron (2015) provide evidence from the audit industry in Canada and France, respectively, that resistance to new regulation can reduce the "independence" of external oversight by creating a state of "co-regulation," in which members of the profession influence the design and execution of the oversight process.…”

Institutional work and regulatory change in the accounting profession

“…These bodies include the PCAOB (Public Company Accounting Oversight Board) in the U.S., the POB (Professional Oversight Board) in the UK and umbrella bodies such as the International Forum of Independent Audit Regulators (IFIAR). While "created to watch the watchers" (Richardson, 2009, p.571), their primary purpose is to enhance or restore public confidence in the financial reporting and auditing of public companies (Arnold, 2009;Caramanis, Dedoulis, & Leventis, 2015;Cooper & Robson, 2006;Guenin-Paracini & Gendron, 2010;Hazgui & Gendron, 2015;Humphrey, Loft, & Woods, 2009;Malsch & Gendron, 2011;Wainberg, Kida, Piercey, & Smith, 2013). The efficacy of these bodies, which are frequently domestically organised and embedded within diverse socio-political national contexts, has come under recent scrutiny (Anantharaman, 2012;Caramanis et al, 2015;Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015).…”

“…Black (2008) warns against expecting that legal validity will grant legitimacy to a regulator in terms of it "having a right to govern both by those it seeks to govern and those on behalf of whom it purports to govern" as such a crude interpretation may be "irrelevant, or at least unproductive" (p.145). Certainly, prior work suggests that such authority is rarely automatic and can be continuously contested (see: Canning & O'Dwyer, 2013;Caramanis et al, 2015;Hazgui & Gendron, 2015;O'Regan & Killian, 2014), especially as a regulatory body evolves over time.…”

“…The paper offers the following contributions. First, it responds to recent requests for more studies of the emergence of accounting oversight in domestic political and social contexts in order to highlight the contextually contingent nature of the local regulatory implementation of global regulatory trends (Caramanis et al, 2015;Hazgui & Gendron, 2015;Jeppesen & Loft, 2011;Malsch & Gendron, 2011;Samsonova-Taddei & Humphrey, 2015). This localised focus is important given that the fragmented character of public oversight operating on a country-by-country basis calls into question how effective oversight bodies are, given the often unique domestic institutional contexts they operate in (Blavoukos, Caramanis, & Dedoulis, 2013;Caramanis et al, 2015).…”