Blur

Allen, Keith

doi:10.1007/s11098-011-9758-6

Cited by 27 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 14 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This is relevant to the Transparency Thesis (Harman, 1990; Martin, 2002) which states that, when we reflect on our perceptual experience, we are only aware of “mind-independent” objects. In particular, this thesis argues that we are not aware of properties of the experience itself (Allen, 2013). A broader view, known as openness, (McDowell, 1994) is that perceptual experience can consist of both mind-independent, and non-mind-independent properties.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Magnitude, precision, and realism of depth perception in stereoscopic vision

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Our perception of depth is substantially enhanced by the fact that we have binocular vision. This provides us with more precise and accurate estimates of depth and an improved qualitative appreciation of the three-dimensional (3D) shapes and positions of objects. We assessed the link between these quantitative and qualitative aspects of 3D vision. Specifically, we wished to determine whether the realism of apparent depth from binocular cues is associated with the magnitude or precision of perceived depth and the degree of binocular fusion. We presented participants with stereograms containing randomly positioned circles and measured how the magnitude, realism, and precision of depth perception varied with the size of the disparities presented. We found that as the size of the disparity increased, the magnitude of perceived depth increased, while the precision with which observers could make depth discrimination judgments decreased. Beyond an initial increase, depth realism decreased with increasing disparity magnitude. This decrease occurred well below the disparity limit required to ensure comfortable viewing.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Magnitude, precision, and realism of depth perception in stereoscopic vision

2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…So perceiving the Müller Lyer lines inclines one to believe that the lines are unequal even when we know (hence believe) that they are in fact the same length. Seeing blurrily does not, according to Allen, incline one to believe that the objects around us are blurry—not even in the minimal sense associated with the Müller Lyer case (Allen, ). Since my framework includes intellectual seemings as well as perceptual experiences and beliefs, I am able to respond to Allen's point.…”

Section: The (Alleged) Counter‐examplesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

Gow

2019

European J of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience is internally constituted. However, my concern in this paper is not with the metaphysical debate but with transparency as a phenomenological feature of perceptual experience. Qualia theorists have presented a number of examples of perceptual experiences which, they claim, do not even seem to be transparent; these experiences involve objects or properties which seem to be internally realized. I argue, contrary to the qualia theorist's claim, that the phenomenal character of perceptual experience can in fact be characterized solely with reference to externally located objects and properties, and the sense in which some features of our perceptual experiences do not seem external is due to cognitive, not perceptual, phenomenology.

show abstract

“…Here I am thinking, for instance, of the phenomenon of blur, which is sometimes invoked to argue against the negative transparency thesis. See, e.g., Crane (2006) and Allen (2013).…”

Section: Temporal Experience and Transparencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Hoerl¹

2018

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Philosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience (call this experiential presence) and that thing's being, or at least appearing to be, temporally present (call this temporal presence). Yet, there is relatively little existing work that goes beyond asserting such a connection and instead examines its specific nature. In this paper, I suggest that we can make progress on the latter by looking at two more specific debates that have hitherto been conducted largely in isolation from each other: one about the nature of conscious experience and one about the nature of time itself. The first concerns the extent to which the temporal properties of experience form an exception to the transparency of experience, meaning that introspection can provide support for one particular view of how experience itself is structured temporally; the second concerns the question as to whether there is something about experience that gives us grounds for thinking that the present is somehow metaphysically special. As I argue, the idea of a connection between experiential presence and temporal presence plays a key background role in each of these debates. Yet it can also, in each of them, be seen to draw one side towards making claims that are supposed to express an important truth but are at the same time, on the face of it, self-contradictory. In each case, resolving what it actually is that these claims are trying to get at turns on recognizing a distinctive feature of perceptual experience, which I refer to as its lack of temporal viewpointedness. Recognising this feature also helps in making sense of what the issues at stake actually are in the intuition of an intimate connection between experiential presence and temporal presence. P hilosophers frequently comment on the intimate connection there is between something's being present in perceptual experience and that thing's being (or at least appearing to be) temporally present. 1 Brian O'Shaughnessy (2000:1. It is a familiar point that, due to the finite speed of light and sound, there is in fact a time-lag before distal events impinge upon our senses, though in the context of ordinary interactions with

show abstract

Blur

Cited by 27 publications

References 14 publications

Magnitude, precision, and realism of depth perception in stereoscopic vision

Magnitude, precision, and realism of depth perception in stereoscopic vision

Everything is clear: All perceptual experiences are transparent

Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About