Bluffs, Lies, and Consequences: A Reconceptualization of Bluffing in Buyer–Supplier Negotiations

Abstract

Business negotiations constitute a key element of supply chain interactions that can create additional value for both the buyer and supplier. However, negotiations can also render the parties vulnerable to deception. While a large body of knowledge on buyer–supplier relationships exists, research on deception and bounded ethicality in supply chain relationships is still nascent. We advance this new research stream in behavioral supply chain management by first conceptualizing two types of deception—bluffs and lies. Departing from previous content‐dependent conceptualizations/definitions, we define both as convention‐dependent, norms‐based constructs: Bluffs (lies) are deceptions that are palatable (unpalatable) to both parties in a buyer–supplier negotiation. Second, studies 1 and 2 of our article employ Q methodology and best–worst scaling to operationalize bluffs while refining the construct of a lie. Third, a correlational study (study 3) examines the psychological properties/cognition of a negotiator who lies, bluffs, or does neither (i.e., communicates honestly). Fourth, a behavioral experiment (study 4) investigates the psychological consequences of bluffs, lies, and honesty for the targets. Bluffers (liars) show low (high) degrees of moral disengagement. Targets of bluffs experience high degrees of self‐directed anger but are willing to engage in further negotiations with the bluffer, while targets of lies experience high degrees of anger directed at the liar and show a low willingness to further negotiate with the liar. Taken together, these findings provide new insights into the dynamics of bluffing and lying in buyer–supplier negotiations.

New Perspectives on Issue Analysis—One‐Sided Preferences as a Strategic Source in Multi‐Issue Negotiations

“…In addition, bluffs about the actual starting date or pretenses to have strict regulations regarding the chance issue were used. This deceptive conduct is a typical high‐power behavior (De Dreu and Van Kleef 2004; Van Kleef et al 2006; Kaufmann et al 2018) and supports the assumption that using the 0‐preference promoted assertive and dominant behavior that might have led to perceived power from the opponent.…”

Toward Relationship Resilience: Managing Buyer‐Induced Breaches of Psychological Contracts During Joint Buyer–Supplier Projects

“…Second, our results highlight the criticality of interpersonal relationships, showing that collaborative interpersonal ties mitigate interorganizational trust loss in collaborative interorganizational relationships. Managers must therefore realize that having a collaborative personal relationship with their counterparts (usually sales managers; Kaufmann, Rottenburger, Carter & Schlereth, ) can generate substantial resilience benefits for collaborative interorganizational relationships when suffering from an unexpected negative event; conversely, adversarial interpersonal relationships can incur additional relational costs. Investments in collaborative interpersonal ties thus seem to function as a protective mechanism at the organizational level.…”

Behavioral Operations and Supply Chain Management–A Review and Literature Mapping

“…These topics are discussed in section Emerging Topics in BOSCM Studies. One of the more established topics is the power balance and trust level between buyers and suppliers and its operational implications (Ireland & Webb, ; Terpend & Ashenbaum, ; Pulles, Veldman, Schiele, & Sierksma, ; Brito & Miguel, ; Aral, Bakos, & Brynjolfsson, ; Kaufmann et al., ). Other related topics are supply chain integration (Enz & Lambert, ; Thornton, Esper, & Autry, ) and supplier development and knowledge transfer (Kim, Hur, & Schoenherr, ; Preston, Chen, Swink, & Meade, ).…”