Bluffing in labor negotiations: Legal and ethical issues

Carson, Thomas L.; Wokutch, Richard E.; Murrmann, Kent F.

doi:10.1007/bf00382801

Cited by 56 publications

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“…Tous ces écrits présentent essentiellement des moyens afin de négo-cier de « façon éthique » (Carr 1968 ;Bowie 1985 ;Lax et Sebenius 1986Byrnes 1987 ;Post 1990 ;Dees et Cramton 1991 ;Doucet 1991 ;Adler et Bigoness 1992 ;Cramton et Dees 1993 ;Briggs et Siegele 1994 ;Burton et Dunn 1996 ;Higgins 1996) ou des critiques relatives à certaines tactiques de négociation (en particulier, le « bluff ») (Carr 1968 ;Carson, Wokutch et Murrmann 1982 ;Beach 1985 ;Bowie 1985 ;Anton 1990 ;Post 1990 ;Adler et Bigoness 1992 ;Carson 1993 ;Reitz, Wall et Love 1998 ;Applbaum 1999 ;Provis 2000). Très peu de ces études reposent sur des démarches empiriques.…”

Section: Résumé De L'articleunclassified

“…Shell (1991) soutient que les tactiques et les comportements jugés non éthiques par les théoriciens sont précisément ceux que les tribunaux considèrent illégaux lors de l'exercice de l'ensemble des négociations inhérentes aux organisations. De nombreux autres auteurs reconnaissent que cette perspective est limitée tant par son champ d'application que par sa portée pratique (Carson, Wokutch et Murrmann 1982 ;Beach 1985 ;Doucet 1990 ;Post 1990 ;Dees et Cramton 1991 ;Ray 1992 ; o 2 Cramton et Dees 1993). Cela est cohérent avec le cadre législatif québécois où l'obligation de diligence et de bonne foi a peu d'effets pratiques (Morin 1991).…”

Section: L'éthique Et Les Tactiques De Négociationunclassified

“…Le bluff est donc possiblement un comportement implicitement accepté en négociation collective. Cela confirme l'éva-luation effectuée par Carr (1968), Carson, Wokutch et Murrmann (1982), Beach (1985), Carson (1993) de même que, jusqu'à un certain point, celle de Anton (1990). Par contre, l'utilisation des faux-semblants demeure en zone grise.…”

Section: Les Résultats De L'enquêteunclassified

“…Ce premier inventaire démontre aussi que l'éthique en ce domaine va bien au-delà des obligations légales associées aux négociations de conventions collectives. Ces résultats vont donc dans le sens des propos tenus par les auteurs qui ont souligné les limites de la perspective légale en matière de légitimité des tactiques de négociation (Carson, Wokutch et Murrmann 1982 ;Beach 1985 ;Dees et Cramton 1991 ;Doucet 1990 ;Post 1990 ;Ray 1992 ;Cramton et Dees 1993). Enfin, rappelons que certains écrits prônent que la réponse à l'éthique en négociation collective repose sur l'application d'une méthode de négociation basée sur les intérêts (Bowie 1985 ;Post 1990 ;Doucet 1991 ;Adler et Bigoness 1992 ;Higgins 1996).…”

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L’éthique en négociation collective

Lapointe

Ross

Legault

2003

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Résumé La littérature spécialisée est peu loquace sur les règles d’éthique spécifiques à appliquer lors du processus de négociation collective. Cet article tente de dresser un premier portrait de ces règles. Suite à des entrevues auprès de praticiennes et praticiens québécois qui oeuvrent à titre de porte-parole syndicaux dans ce domaine, ce premier inventaire indique que le bilan des écrits actuels néglige certaines facettes de la négociation collective. Les résultats font de plus ressortir que l’éthique en la matière va au-delà de l’application d’une méthode de négociation basée sur les intérêts.

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Section: Résumé De L'articleunclassified

Section: L'éthique Et Les Tactiques De Négociationunclassified

Section: Les Résultats De L'enquêteunclassified

Section: éNoncés Exemples De Citationsunclassified

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L’éthique en négociation collective

Lapointe

Ross

Legault

2003

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“…In recent times, several philosophers have challenged this view, presenting some compelling counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition: lies under coercion (Siegler 1966:129, Carson 1988, lies to Ògo on the recordÓ, bald-faced lies (Carson et al 1982:17, Carson 2006:290, Sorensen 2007, Arico & Fallis 2013, and knowledge lies (Sorensen 2009). This has prompted many authors to drop (iii).…”

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Lying by Promising

Marsili

2016

Int Rev Pragmat

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This paper is divided into two parts. In the first part, I extend the traditional definition of lying to illocutionary acts executed by means of explicit performatives, focusing on promising. This is achieved in two steps. First, I discuss how the utterance of a sentence containing an explicit performative such as ÒI promise that ΦÓ can count as an assertion of its content Φ. Second, I develop a general account of insincerity meant to explain under which conditions a given illocutionary act can be insincere, and show how this applies to promises. I conclude that a promise to Φ is insincere (and consequently a lie) only if the speaker does not intend to Φ, or believes that he will not Φ, or both. In the second part, I test the proposed definition of lying by promising against the intuitions of ordinary language speakers. The results show that, unlike alternative accounts, the proposed definition makes the correct predictions in the cases tested. Furthermore, these results challenge the following necessary conditions for telling a lie with content p: that you have to assert p directly; that you have to believe that p be false; that p must be false; that you must aim to deceive the addressee into believing that p. In recent times, several philosophers have challenged this view, presenting some compelling counterexamples to the intention to deceive condition: lies under coercion (Siegler 1966:129, Carson 1988, lies to Ògo on the recordÓ, bald-faced lies (Carson 2 See Mannison (1969:132), Kupfer (1982:134), Simpson (1992), Williams (2002: 96), Faulkner (2007;, Meibauer (2005;. :17, Carson 2006:290, Sorensen 2007, Arico & Fallis 2013, and knowledge lies (Sorensen 2009). This has prompted many authors to drop (iii). 2However, rejecting (iii) comes at a price: a definition only featuring (i-ii) runs the risk of incorrectly ruling in fictional, ironical and metaphorical utterances. These are believed-false statements (i.e. they meet both condition (i) and (ii)), but are clearly not lies Condition (iii) correctly prevents the definition from counting these statements as lies. A putative alternative definition that rejects (iii) needs some alternative condition to play its role in ruling out these cases.A common way to respond to this challenge is to endorse an Ôassertion-basedÕ account of lying. The intuition behind this view is that the Ôstatement conditionÕ of the standard definition can be narrowed down, to require that the speaker genuinely assert the proposition that he believes to be false. Formally: An assertion-based definition can be further strengthened by requiring that also (iii) is satisfied, and some proponents of the intention to deceive condition endorse an assertion-based version of the standard view, in which both (iii) and (i*) 4 are required 3 Carson (2006; ), Sorensen (2007), Fallis (2009), Saul (2012), Stokke (2013. Except for Sorensen, all these authors spell out the assertion condition differently to (1*), specifying under which conditions a speakerÕs statement is a genuine assertion. 4 Chisholm a...

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Bluffing and Deception

Carson

2015

Wiley Encyclopedia of Management

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Deception can be defined as intentionally causing someone to have false beliefs. Bluffing in negotiations involves attempting to deceive others about one's intentions or negotiating position. In the United States it is common, often a matter of course, for people to misstate their intentions during business negotiations. For example, suppose that Bob is selling a house and tells a prospective buyer that $350,000 is absolutely the lowest price that he will accept, when he knows that he would be willing to accept as little as $320,000 for the house (in this case $320,000 is his “reservation price”). Arguments for and against the view that this is permissible are considered. In sales and negotiations sellers often provide prospective buyers information about the goods or services being sold. Ths legal principle of caveat emptor permits sellers to withhold information about the products they serve, but forbids lying and deception about this. Few defend lying or deception in sales, but the permissibility of withholding information about the nature of the goods and services one sells is the subject of some debate.

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Bluffing in labor negotiations: Legal and ethical issues

Cited by 56 publications

References 1 publication

L’éthique en négociation collective

L’éthique en négociation collective

Lying by Promising

Bluffing and Deception

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