“Blue Ribbon” Commissions, Interest Groups, and the Formulation of Policy in the American States

Abstract

Despite the prevalence of state‐level commissions convened to make policy recommendations, research to date has not systematically investigated the ways in which these bodies impact policy or degree to which state‐level interest groups can use these institutions in that process. We argue that less powerful groups will favor these mechanisms and use them to get issues onto the institutional agenda and to increase the likelihood of legislative success. We also suggest that traditionally powerful groups will oppose the creation of reform‐minded task forces, but will likely use them to hinder policy change once they are formed. We test this assertion in an analysis of the creation and recommendations of task forces convened to study autism insurance mandates, as well as the eventual adoption of such mandates, in the American states between 2001 and 2010. The results suggest that public and industry groups influence the formation and recommendations of task forces, but that the latter appears to have a relatively larger impact. They also suggest that a task force recommendation has a large impact on the likelihood of adopting an autism insurance mandate and that neither the insurance industry nor autism advocacy groups have a direct influence on adoption after controlling for the presence of a recommendation.

The Effects of Risk, Beliefs, and Trust in Education Policy Networks: The Case of Autism and Special Education

“…There are a few caveats to the current study, and future research will benefit from improving upon these weaknesses to further understand the politics of coordination and cooperation in policy networks. First, the study uses data from three regions in a single state, and given state‐level variation in autism and special education policies (Chatterji, Decker, & Markowitz, ; Ritchey & Nicholson‐Crotty, ), there are certainly limits on the generalizability of these findings to other education policy environments. Second, the network survey data are cross‐sectional, and are not able to capture how these special education policy networks might form and evolve over time.…”

“…In recent years, the scope of special education costs and accommodations has been particularly notable for students diagnosed with autism, one of many eligible disabilities under the IDEA and defined by the U.S. Department of Education as a “developmental disability significantly affecting verbal and nonverbal communication and social interaction … that adversely affects a child's educational performance” (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, ). The complexity of services and expertise required to educate these students is comparable to other eligible disabilities (Baker & Stokes, ; Bumiller, ; Davidson & Orsini, ; Orsini, ; Pitney, ), but what makes autism particularly challenging for LEAs is that, as Ritchey and Nicholson‐Crotty (, p. 76) note, “[t]hose diagnosed with autism are the fastest growing population of special needs children in the United States.” To that end, Pitney (, p. 9) argues that, “With autism politics, complexity accompanies uncertainty,” and continues by adding that, “No government agency has exclusive jurisdiction over all of these areas.”…”

Does the Motivation for Market‐Based Reform Matter? The Case of Responsibility‐Centered Management

“…To model the adoption of RCM in stage one of our analysis, we employ Cox regression models with time‐varying independent variables (Box‐Steffensmeier and Jones ), which has been widely used within the literature on diffusion and innovation (Jensen ; Ritchey and Nicholson‐Crotty ). The basic premise of this approach is to estimate the relationship between each of the independent variables in the regression model and the likelihood (hazard) that some event will occur (in this case, that a university adopts RCM).…”

Advocacy for the Poor

“…While much of this literature focuses on the national level, a growing number of studies explore influence at the state level in areas as diverse as education, health, environment, and animal welfare (Allen, 2005;Gerber, 1999;Mintrom & Vergari, 1998;Ringquist, 1994;Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015; Shipan in advocacy on behalf of the poor. Although they are legally prohibited from contributing money to political campaigns and face limitations on their lobbying activities, many "act like" interest groups in their interactions with government officials, especially at state and local levels (Berry & Arons, 2003).…”

“…In certain circumstances, advocates may be able to use their expertise to influence the decisions of policymakers eager to address a poverty-related problem and develop policies that have a high likelihood of success (Esterling, 2004;Kingdon, 1989). Moreover, recent studies find evidence of policy influence among comparatively weaker groups, such as those that are small in size and have limited monetary resources (Allen, 2005;Ritchey & Nicholson-Crotty, 2015). These studies suggest that even those groups with relatively fewer resources can achieve influence in state policymaking processes.…”