Blocking<i>Enosis</i>: Britain and the Cyprus question, March‐December 1956

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis

doi:10.1080/03086539108582838

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 1 publication

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Turkey had helped Britain to block Enosis at the beginning of the emergency, but Ankara demanded partition in return (Hatzivassiliou 1991). In June 1958 the Turkish government decided to coerce Britain and ordered TMT to attack and expel Greek Cypriots from those areas where the Turks were the majority in an attempt to impose partition.…”

Section: Communal Conflict and The End Of The Emergency (November 1957 -February 1959)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

Scarinzi

2021

Defence Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article examines the Cyprus Emergency (1955)(1956)(1957)(1958)(1959) to test the force structure thesis. According to the thesis, armies that deploy more manpower per armored vehicle would succeed in counterinsurgency because they could win people's trust, secure intelligence from civilians, and use force selectively. Using the congruence method of within-case analysis, I show that the causal process and logic of the force structure argument are not confirmed in the favorable case of Cyprus. Despite its preference for infantry and police units, the British garrison failed to win over the people and persuade civilians to share information about the insurgent; besides, Britain's intelligence breakthroughs and selective violence did not result from the logic of the force structure thesis, nor did the conflict end as the argument would predict. Political conditions, instead, played a greater role. Ultimately, the case of Cyprus warns against the reassuring belief, inherent in the force structure thesis, that military organizational adjustments in favor of manpower can pave the way to victory against irregular opponents.

show abstract

Section: Communal Conflict and The End Of The Emergency (November 1957 -February 1959)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

Scarinzi

2021

Defence Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Our analysis ends in 1960, the year when Cyprus finally received its longawaited independence after the 1959 Zürich and London agreements. While historical research has comprehensively analyzed the Cyprus issue in the relations between Greece, Great Britain and the United States [Hatzivassiliou 1991;Johnson 2000;Ioannides 2014] relatively fewer works have appeared on its interaction with other major powers of the Cold War, the Soviet Union [Ulunyan 2001].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of the Cyprus Issue in the Greek-Soviet Relations (1956-1960)

Tasoulas

2021

Vestn. Ross. univ. družby nar., Ser. Meždunar. otnoš.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The article examines the role of the Cyprus issue in the bilateral relations between Greece and the USSR in 1956-1960. It is based on primal archival research realised at the Constantine Karamanlis Archive (AKK) and at the Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry (DIAYE) in Athens. The analysis of the recently declassified documents relate to the events which took place in 1954, when the Soviet Union supported the Greek claims for self-determination of the Cypriot people in the United Nations on the basis of the anti-colonial principles. This contributed to the impressive increase in trade between Greece and the USSR, especially after the unofficial visit of the Soviet Foreign Minister D.T. Shepilov to Athens in 1956. Against the backdrop of the deterioration of the international situation in 1957, Kremlin heavily criticized NATOs decision to deploy the US Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBMs) in Europe and applied diplomatic pressures to NATO member-states including Greece. The shift from tensions to a peaceful offensive strategy, characteristic of the Soviet diplomacy towards Greece, proved to be a double-edged sword for Moscow in the long term. The author concludes that both countries exploited the Cyprus issue for their benefit. Thus, Moscow managed to take advantage of the Greek discontent with the NATO allies as a means of increasing its own prestige in the region, while the Greek governments capitalized on the Soviet tactics in order to increase its political leverage in confronting NATO on Cyprus.

show abstract

Divide and rule Cyprus? Decolonisation as process

Demetriou

2019

Commonwealth & Comparative Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Instances of decolonisation can be considered processes featuring complicated interactions that are both path-dependent and open-ended. This perspective contrasts with reductionist epistemologies, particularly economistic ones. Viewing the decolonisation of Cyprus in processual terms, this article argues that the process at hand was crucially shaped by the colonial strategy of divide-and-rule and that the process's complicated flow of interactions obscured the British government's ability to assess the unfolding predicament clearly, failing most particularly to rank its options optimally by misreading the option of granting independence to Cyprus.

show abstract

BlockingEnosis: Britain and the Cyprus question, March‐December 1956

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

Force structure and counterinsurgency outcome: the case of the Cyprus Emergency (1955-1959)

The Role of the Cyprus Issue in the Greek-Soviet Relations (1956-1960)

Divide and rule Cyprus? Decolonisation as process

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About