In this paper, we show that ownership structures vary considerably across Europe and that ownership has a significant impact on firm performance. We observe that ownership structures in Europe are not consistent with value maximisation principles. Ultimately, our results show that dominant shareholders destroy value. These findings are in contradiction to similar research based on US samples. Our results remain robust after controlling for industry and country effects, liquidity, and the type of owner. We base our analysis on a new and unique dataset of uniform ownership data of the largest 100 firms in the five major European economies. We quantify the differences in ownership by comparing three distinct ownership structures of firms and relating them to performance. For the first time we employ a Hodrick-Prescott Filter, a methodology widely used in macroeconomics to isolate the trend growth components from cyclical fluctuations, to estimate the share price trend of each firm. We take this trend as a good indirect indicator of the quality of governance.JEL Classification: G32, G34, G38.