Blockchain-Based Firmware Security Check and Recovery for Smart Inverters

Bere, Gomanth; Ahn, Bohyun; Ochoa, Justin J.; Kim, Taesic; Hadi, Abdullah Al; Choi, Joon-Seok

doi:10.1109/apec42165.2021.9487468

Cited by 11 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…CF-IP proactively detects and prevents malicious controllerfirmware update, consequently compromising the control algorithm codes, control setting parameters, and controller input data. An example is a blockchain-based firmware patching for a smart inverter [38] with continuous authentication, integrity, and authorization process during the firmware update and the results are stored in the ledger as security logs. Another example is a controller digital twin method, which exams a new version of controller firmware in a twin controller, while the current version of controller firmware still runs in the main controller [39].…”

Section: Controller-firmware Attack Defense (Attacks #8-10)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Once the operating controller-firmware malfunction event is detected, the standby digital twin controller automatically takes over the primary work of the inverter controller. Another example is an automatic firmware rollback and patching process through the blockchain-enabled security module [38]. FF methods should be developed, including controller memory forensics.…”

Section: Controller-firmware Attack Defense (Attacks #8-10)mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors in [35] and [36] introduced cybersecurity vulnerabilities of smart inverters and their impacts on power system operation. Real-time firmware security of smart inverters against controller-firmware modification has been studied [37], [38], [39]. In [39], a power-router prototype using a dual-controller design was proposed to improve uptime and controller-firmware security.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

An Overview of Cyber-Resilient Smart Inverters Based on Practical Attack Models

Ahn,

Kim,

Ahmad

et al. 2024

IEEE Trans. Power Electron.

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With high penetration of distributed energy resources (DERs), power systems are increasingly transforming into distributed power grids, which provide grid automation, decarbonization, and decentralization of critical assets. Smart inverters are key power-electronic devices that connect renewable energy and energy storage equipment to power grids. DER includes several intelligent grid functions, such as fault ride through, grid-voltage support, and reactive-power compensation, typically with real-time remote access, data exchange, and seamless over-the-air firmware updates in a cyber-physical environment. However, cybersecurity concerns arise due to extensive information exchange among DER and multiple stakeholders (e.g., utilities, aggregators, vendors, operators, and owners). Therefore, smart inverters account for a growing attack surface for the power grid. This article reviews the cybersecurity best practices and current recommendations for smart inverters and explores emerging cyber threats for smart inverters, including malware attacks and hardware attacks. Finally, we propose a new smart inverter security and resilience framework for developing cyber-resilient smart inverters against the advanced/future threat actors. This article establishes a resilience-by-design baseline reference for smart inverter cybersecurity teams, which bridges the gap between cybersecurity and power-electronics' communities.

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Section: Controller-firmware Attack Defense (Attacks #8-10)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Controller-firmware Attack Defense (Attacks #8-10)mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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An Overview of Cyber-Resilient Smart Inverters Based on Practical Attack Models

Ahn,

Kim,

Ahmad

et al. 2024

IEEE Trans. Power Electron.

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“…Attackers also exploit software/firmware update events to create cyber-attacks [50], which can directly or indirectly target the inverter controller, as described in Section II.B. The attack surface of software/firmware in a solar farm control center and smart inverters includes three major attack points [51]: 1) Remote vendor access via the regular software update and maintenance; 2) Operator access via a remote user interface; and 3) Physical access via USB flash drives or LAN or reverse engineering/side-channel attacks. Advanced attackers such as advanced persistent threat (APT) groups [52] and insider threats (e.g., disgruntled employees or malicious insiders [53]) can disguise as vendors or authorized users to modify software or Fig.…”

Section: Network and Software/firmware Security In Pv Farmmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Attackers who can access the inverter 'firmware enable' function can modify the behavior of the inverter and lead to malfunction or performance degradation (i.e., stealthy attacks that avoid being detected by intrusion detection systems (IDSs)). For example, the sensor matrix, Y(t), which is generated by embedded sensors in the inverter, can be altered by injecting malicious code in the inverter firmware through flash memory data modification in an inverter control card [55] or over-the-air update [51]. The software/firmware and in-transit data modifications will occur once the chains of cyber-attacks are successful.…”

Section: Network and Software/firmware Security In Pv Farmmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Review of Cyber–Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

You-hai

Giani

Elasser

et al. 2022

IEEE J. Emerg. Sel. Topics Power Electron.

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A Review of Cybersecurity in Grid-Connected Power Electronics Converters: Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, and Testbeds

Fu,

Lichtenwalner,

Johnson

2023

IEEE Access

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With the increasing installations of solar energy, electric vehicles, and other distributed energy resources and the deeper developments of digitalization and standardization, cybersecurity became more and more essential and critical in modern power systems. Unfortunately, most prior research work focuses on the cybersecurity of power transmission and distribution networks other than distributed energy devices and their grid-connected power converters. Focusing on the Grid-Connected Power Electronics Converters (GCPECs), this article does a comprehensive review of existing outcomes from selected references, in the aspects of vulnerabilities, countermeasures, and testbeds. By analyzing the GCPEC's layout and countermeasure candidates, it is found that the vulnerabilities of GCPECs include both cyber and physical layers that are easily accessible to malicious hackers. These vulnerabilities in the two layers must be considered simultaneously and coordinate well with each other. Especially, hardware hardening is an essential approach to enhance cybersecurity within GCPECs. It is also noticed that the detection and mitigation approaches should consider the complexity of algorithms to be applied and assess the limits of computing and data processing capabilities in GCPECs while evaluating the feasibility of countermeasure candidates to cyberattacks in testbeds. In addition, the countermeasures should meet relevant standards, such as IEEE-1547.1, IEEE-2030.5, IEC-61850, and IEC-62351, to ensure the interoperability and cybersecurity of GCPEC devices in smart grids. Finally, based on the review and analysis, four recommendations are raised for future research on GCPEC's cybersecurity and their applications in smart grids.

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Blockchain-Based Firmware Security Check and Recovery for Smart Inverters

Cited by 11 publications

References 10 publications

An Overview of Cyber-Resilient Smart Inverters Based on Practical Attack Models

An Overview of Cyber-Resilient Smart Inverters Based on Practical Attack Models

A Review of Cyber–Physical Security for Photovoltaic Systems

A Review of Cybersecurity in Grid-Connected Power Electronics Converters: Vulnerabilities, Countermeasures, and Testbeds

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